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5INTRODUCTION
Judicial reform in Bulgaria started in the beginning of the nineties as part
of the process of political, economic and social transformation in the
context of transition to democracy. As it has very specific functions and a
peculiar place within the system of State power, the Judiciary is believed
to have a paramount role for the successful completion of that transition
in general, for the promotion of the rule of law by ensuring institutional
stability and protecting fundamental rights, and for the efficient
suppression of corruption as a major problem of the transitional period
that is still to be resolved. The progress in reforming judicial branch of
power will largely predetermine the successful accession of Bulgaria to
the European Union and the countrys future membership. Therefore,
the level attained in reforming the legal system and the system of the
Judiciary are perpetually monitored and regularly assessed by numerous
international organizations and institutions, as well as by domestic civic
organizations and initiatives whose basic instruments and programmatic
documents also contain proposals as to how judicial reforms should
proceed further. From among those, the following could be singled out:
l the European Commission, via its annual Regular Reports;
l Coalition 2000 (www.anticorruption.bg), the most influential anti-
corruption initiative in Bulgaria, via its Clean Future Anti-Corruption Action
Plan and its Corruption Assessment Reports (provided on an annual basis
since 1999, in particular their sections on the legal, institutional and
judicial reforms analyzed against the background of the status and
dynamics of corruption), and via the corruption indexes which form
the major product of the Corruption Monitoring System (the levels of
those indicators are updated every quarter based on empirical data);
l Judicial Reform Initiative (www.csd.bg/jri) which brings together the
efforts of eminent Bulgarian professional associations and non-
governmental organizations involved with the problems of judicial
reform, and representatives of government agencies, via its Program
for Judicial Reform in Bulgaria drafted in 1999-2000 and its follow-up
initiatives;
l The EU Accession Monitoring Program of the Open Society Institute, via
its reports on the capacity of the Judiciary in accession countries
(www.eumap.org);
l Central and Eurasian Law Initiative of the American Bar Association
(www.abanet.org/ceeli) via the Judicial Reform Index which is based on
the assessment of a set of factors and criteria;
l United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Bulgaria, via the
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projects Comprehensive Review of the Administrative and Commercial Justice
Systems in Bulgaria (1 June 2002 to 31 March 2003) and Improving Juvenile
Justice (October 2002 - March 2004), implemented in partnership with
the Ministry of Justice of Bulgaria (www.undp.bg/bg/projects/
projects.php);
l Research by and the Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank,
especially with respect to legal and judicial reforms and the suppression
of corruption (www.worldbank.bg).
Irrespective of some shadings, all those assessments and reports mirror
the shared understanding that a number of important issues are still on
the agenda of judicial reforms in Bulgaria, such as the need to achieve
legal stability and confidence in the Judiciary, to provide conditions for a
more efficient and transparent administration of justice, to put internal
monitoring mechanisms in place to resist corruption and the misuse of
powers within the Judiciary, to provide for guarantees against any possible
politicization of the Judiciary.
The problems of corruption affect most painfully the perceptions of the
Judiciary in the country and the assessment of its work. The key units of
the Judiciary are called upon to investigate, and impose penalties for,
corrupt crimes. Any failure to fulfil, or to fulfil on time, those functions
therefore perturbs public confidence in the Judiciary. Even worse, the
existence of corruption with the Judiciary brings harm to the society and
to the State, and perverts the very nature of the Judiciary, while preventing
it from carrying out the functions vested in it by the Constitution and by
the laws, namely to protect the rights and the lawful interests of citizens,
legal entities and the State.
In addition to the prevailing impunity of corruption that is widespread in
all spheres of society, the instances of corruption inside the Judiciary are
so much more demoralizing as they undermine the very ideas of justice,
democracy and the rule of law. Simultaneously with the pressure of civil
society in Bulgaria for serious measures for judicial reform to be
undertaken, including inter alia an effective fight against corruption in the
Judiciary, and given the numerous critical evaluations of the Bulgarian
judicial system (e.g. the regular reports released by the European
Commission and other forms and instruments of international monitoring),
a growing number of magistrates come up with specific ideas and
suggestions as to how the Judiciary should be reformed and how
corruption should be resisted.
The Judicial Anti-Corruption Program has been developed by lead members
of the legal professions in Bulgaria, including magistrates, and has emerged
from the joint efforts of influential non-governmental organizations,
representatives of Government agencies and experts to ensure the
successful implementation of judicial reform in Bulgaria. The Program
builds on the suggestions made in the Program for Judicial Reform, on a
number of measures from the Government Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary
in Bulgaria and on the steps proposed within the framework of various
civic anti-corruption initiatives and international instruments for
monitoring and evaluation of judicial reform in Bulgaria, while focusing
on the prevention and suppression of corruption inside the Judiciary. In
the drafting process, the results have been taken into consideration of
the public opinion polls on judicial reforms, on the amendments to the
7Constitution and on corruption in the Judiciary, in particular the survey by
the National Public Opinion Center with the National Assembly (July-
August 2002), Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of Bulgaria1,  and
the survey Corruption and Anti-corruption: The stand of magistrates (April -
May 2003), conducted by the Vitosha Research Agency within the
framework of the Corruption Monitoring System of Coalition 20002.
The Judicial Anti-Corruption Program delineates the parameters for a
comprehensive crackdown on the problems faced by the Judiciary and
for a radical change inspired by a long-term objective. The specific
short-term measures and suggestions also form part of that broad context
and are consistent with its fundamental goal, i.e. building up a working,
stable, corruption-free Judiciary which is the most efficient tool to promote
the rule of law and to rein in corruption in society.
It becomes increasingly important to address the problems in the Judiciary,
including those that require the implementation of anti-corruption
measures, on the basis of consensus among the political forces in Bulgaria,
on the one hand, and between those political forces and the civil society,
on the other hand, moreover with the active involvement of all bodies of
the Judiciary. The Declaration on the Guidelines to Reform the Bulgarian
Judicial System signed on 2 April 2003 by the political forces represented
in Parliament could well serve as a point of departure in search of a
genuine, broad consensus to achieve the stated objectives of judicial
reform.
The present Program aims to support that process and to contribute to
arriving at social and political consensus on the overarching guidelines
and principles, as well as on the urgent measures and the long-term goals
of judicial reforms.
1 The survey was conducted within the framework of the fifth round of the research project The Expert Opinion of Bulgarian
Lawyers and covers expert opinions from 120 Bulgarian professionals with a legal background (MPs, legal experts, judges,
attorneys, in-house lawyers, prosecutors, investigators and university professors).
2 The survey involved 454 magistrates from all over the country. The individual respondents were selected accidentally
within three main groups, namely 179 judges, 126 prosecutors and 149 investigators.
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PART ONE
REFORM IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY.
REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUDICIAL BODIES.
TRAINING OF MAGISTRATES AND COURT CLERKS
I. REFORM IN THE ORGANIZATION (STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT)
OF THE JUDICIARY: CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGISLATIVE AND
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
The debate about the failed or implausible proposals to reform the
Judiciary so as to make it more efficient in combating corruption has
revealed the prevailing view that the key impediment is the existing
constitutional model which regulates the most essential aspects of the
structure, organization, operational principles and functions of the third
power.
Moreover, a disturbing trend has been perceived within the Judiciary,
namely that the bodies of the system deny responsibility and incriminate
each other for the spread of corruption. This is a demonstration of serious
flaws in the understanding of the place and role of the different units and
of the relationships in
which they engage.
The trend to attribute
the responsibility for
corruption to a branch
of the Judiciary other
than your own is also
visible from the assess-
ments of the stages of
criminal and civil pro-
ceedings. One out of
four judges states that
corruption is most
widely spread at the
stage of preliminary
proceedings, while
one out of five judges
believes the same
about police investiga-
tion. And vice versa, prosecutors and investigators identify the court
stage as the key stage of criminal proceedings where corrupt practices
abound.
The practice so far, viz. piece-meal reforms and the lack of satisfactory
results of the efforts made, are indicative of the need for a comprehen-
sive approach that should cover all the required constitutional, legisla-
tive, organizational and institutional reforms. With that approach, the
Constitution will be expected to regulate solely the general aspects of
Spread of corruption among:
(relative share of responses
Most or all magistrates are involved)
Magistrate Judges Prosecutors Investigators
1. Judge 2.8 17.4 19.0
2. Prosecutor 11.9 7.9 10.3
3. Investigator 20.8 28.2 4.7
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000
ASSESSMENT OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION WITHIN THE
THREE GROUPS OF MAGISTRATES (PER CENT)
1. General
9the structure, prin-
ciples and functions
of the Judiciary ,
whereas the details
should be elaborated
on in the legislation
adopted within the
framework of the re-
spective constitutional
model.
On the other hand, is-
sues such as the intro-
duction of standards
for t imeliness and
good quality, of the
required degrees of
transparency and
openness in the work
of the Judiciary, of ef-
fective anti-corruption
measures in general,
and especially in the
branches of the Judi-
ciary, the improve-
ment of the criteria for recruiting professionals and for regular evaluation
of their performance, the improved efficiency of disciplinary proceed-
ings against magistrates, etc. could be resolved by way of Acts of Parlia-
ment even within the current constitutional model.
Expert opinions on judicial reform
During the survey held in July-August 2002 and devoted to the
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of Bulgaria, expert opinions
were received from 120 Bulgarian professionals with a legal
background (MPs, legal experts, judges, attorneys, in-house lawyers,
prosecutors, investigators and professors). The most frequent
suggestions concerned possible amendments in relation to the
Judiciary, for example:
l bringing down the number of prosecutorial warrants which
produce effects similar to court judgments (66.4%);
l limiting the immunity of magistrates only to the steps they
undertake in court (69.2%);
l introducing terms of office for magistrates in managerial positions
(86.7%);
l providing reasonable restrictions on the absolute irremovability
of magistrates (80.6%);
l introducing two-instance proceedings for some groups of civil
and criminal cases (73.3%).
The respondents also emphasized the need to reduce the length of
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION WITHIN DIFFERENT GROUPS OF
MAGISTRATES (PER CENT)
8,1
16,1
9,7
44,3
43,2
42,1
28,4
22,2
26,9
16,1
16,3
19,2
3,1
2,2
2,2
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Judges
Prosecutors
Investigators
Almost all are involved Most are involved A few involved
Almost no one involved Does not know-No response
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court proceedings in almost all cases, and the need to change the
work and the structure of the Supreme Judicial Council.
At the same time, the views on whether or not public prosecution
and investigation should be moved out of the Judiciary are split
almost fifty-fifty.
Source: National Public Opinion Center  with the National Assembly
The structure of the Judiciary usually kindles opposing opinions and
evaluations: professionals on the one extreme of the scale believe that
the status quo should be preserved at any rate, while those on the other
extreme invoke reasons for various forms of restructuring some of which
require serious constitutional amendments, moreover ones to be enacted
by a Great National Assembly (according to Judgment of the Constitutional
Court No. 3 of 10 April 2003 on constitutional case No. 22 of 2002).
Regardless of the understanding that structural changes cannot in
themselves resolve all problems the Judiciary is faced with, and even less
so the problem of corruption, the introduction or the failure to make
such changes would largely predetermine the decisions to be made with
respect to the management, functions and organizational principles of
the Judiciary. A long-term anti-corruption program in the Judiciary should
therefore take into consideration any discussed options for structural
reforms, be those introduced sooner or later. The Judicial Anti-Corruption
Program tackles the specific anti-corruption measures and proposals in
the short run against the backdrop of the current structure and
organization of the Judiciary, while the long-term proposals take account
of the possible options for restructuring the Judiciary in future.
Expert opinions on the possible amendments to the Constitution
with respect to the Judiciary
While 71.1 per cent of respondent lawyers back the need to amend
the Constitution, nearly 40 per cent of them believe that the
Constitution needs no amendments as far as the Judiciary is
concerned. The reason advanced is that the Judiciary is not
obstructed by the Constitution but by the alleged poor performance
and corruption of some magistrates.
Source: National Public Opinion Center  with the National Assembly
In the short run, if the current structure of the judicial branch intact, the
measures proposed below - constitutional, legislative and organizational
- should be undertaken to address the management of the Judiciary, the
capacity building and reinforcement of its branches (court, public
prosecution and investigation), their major functions and organizational
principles. Steps should also be made to decentralize the system of public
prosecution.
In the longer run, two alternative options of amending the Constitution
with regard to the Judiciary are also put forward for discussion (as
mentioned, the judgment of the Constitutional Court referred to earlier
has clarified that such steps could only be made by a Great National
Assembly).
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2.1. Organizational principles underlying the operation of the
Judiciary
The efficient fight against corruption in the Judiciary requires that the
fundamental organizational principles on which the system is based and
operates be specified in the Constitution and in the legislation in force,
viz. independence of the Judiciary, immunity and irremovability of
magistrates, fixed terms of office and rotation of magistrates in managerial
positions. It should not be forgotten that any re-examination of those
organizational principles is largely conditional on the option to be
chosen for the restructuring of the Judiciary, in general, and on the
measures aimed at decentralizing public prosecution, in particular. It
should be borne in mind, however, that if some of those principles
(immunity, independence) were changed ahead of all other major reforms,
that would entail new risks and nourish the attempts for unlawful pressure,
thus provoking instability.
l The constitutional principle of independence of the Judiciary should
be maintained. It should not, however, be an end in itself or amount
to irresponsibility but should be the precondition for the fully-fledged
fulfilment of the tasks of the Judiciary, viz. to ensure lawfulness and
fairness, to defend the laws and protect the rights. In other words,
lucid mechanisms of mutual control (checks and balances) of the three
powers should be introduced. The lack of such mechanisms in the
existing model, including its constitutional framework, is one of the
reasons why independence is sometimes perceived as unap-
proachability. Therefore, the purpose of the proposed options for
changes in the management and structure of the Judiciary, public pros-
ecution and the investigation, for making their powers more specific
and redefining their fundamental organizational principles is to pre-
vent the threats of concentrating too much power in the same hands
and of abuse, while establishing a balance of powers that would not
affect the essence of the principle of independence.
l The proposed reforms look at the principle of independence of the
Judiciary in the context of the overarching principle of separation of
powers and the ensuing relationships among those powers. Motivation
along these lines may be found in Judgment No. 1 of the Constitutional
Court of 14 January 1999. The judgment draws attention to the
required link between the Legislature and the Executive, while
emphasizing that the separation of powers does not imply that those
powers should not interact or function consistently with each other.
On the contrary, the three powers are bound by relations of mutual
control and deterrence embedded in the Constitution. In that context,
it is suggested to consider amending the Constitution so as to introduce
a requirement that the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation,
the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and the
Prosecutor General be elected by the National Assembly for a term
of office exceeding four years. Likewise, the National Assembly should
have the power to remove those individuals earlier from office and to
decide on lifting their immunity, though solely on conditions and under
a procedure strictly defined in the Constitution. A logical follow-up to
that idea would be to provide a possibility for the Presidents of the
Supreme Court of Cassation and of the Supreme Administrative Court,
2. Proposed reforms
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and for the Prosecutor General to answer questions raised by MPs, in
cases strictly defined by the legislation and under a well-established
procedure. This way, the National Assembly could play a vital part in
ensuring the checks and balances among the three powers, without
interfering with the independence of the Judiciary.
l An issue that is especially important for the independence of the
Judiciary in the context of the separation of powers is the one about
the status and structure of public prosecution. Moreover, magistrates
cherish quite opposing views on whether or not the existing unified
and centralized structure of public prosecution is beneficial to the
growth of corruption - many of them (judges and investigators) would
answer that question in the affirmative, while prosecutors find
themselves on the other pole.
In any case, however,
carefully weighed
measures aimed at a
reasonable decen-
tralization of public
prosecution  are
needed and possible
within the frame of the
current constitutional
model, and that could
be achieved by
amending and supple-
menting the organic
law. The present cen-
tralized and hierarchi-
cal model of the pros-
ecution system is not
predetermined by the
Const i tut ion  whose
provisions would not
be affected if the leg-
islation in force limits
the opportunities of
the Prosecutor Gen-
eral and of superior
prosecutors to inter-
fere with the work of
prosecutors at lower
levels.  Legislative
amendments coupled
with organizational
and structural changes
can and must result in:
providing guarantees for the independence of prosecutors of any supe-
rior prosecutor or of the administrative head of the respective prosecu-
tion office when deciding on specific files and cases (e.g. written instruc-
tions, a recognized right to object against the instructions by superior
prosecutors or to step out of the case in the event of disagreement, etc.);
refining the grounds for disciplining individual prosecutors for their deci-
%
Yes 20.5
Rather yes 24.7
Rather no 27.1
No 20.3
Does not know/No response 7.5
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
IMPACT OF THE EXISTING UNIFIED AND CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTION ON THE GROWTH OF CORRUPTION WITHIN
THE PROSECUTION, IN THE VIEW OF MAGISTRATES (PER CENT)
Yes Rather yes Rather no No Does not know / No response
Judge 26.3 29.1 27.4 8.4 8.9
Prosecutor 5.6 10.3 30.2 50.0 4.0
Investigator 26.2 31.5 24.2 9.4 8.7
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
IMPACT OF THE EXISTING UNIFIED AND CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTION ON THE GROWTH OF CORRUPTION WITHIN
THE PROSECUTION, BY CATEGORY OF MAGISTRATES (PER CENT)
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sions on specific files and cases; attaching the prosecution offices to
the corresponding courts; introducing terms of office, not exceeding three
years, for the administrative heads of prosecution offices. The need for
comprehensive measures is prompted by the fact that some of the pro-
posed guarantees exist in the legislation even now but are not always
implemented. For example, the mandatory written form of instructions
and the possibility to object against such instructions are not sufficient an
obstacle to the unlawful practice of issuing instructions orally. That prac-
tice exists primarily because of the powers of the Prosecutor General and
of the heads of the respective prosecution offices to make proposals for
the appointment, removal from office, relocation, demotion or promo-
tion of individual prosecutors.
A much-needed corrective to be introduced through constitutional
amendments is the position of public officials who should be endowed
with prosecutorial functions by the law (similar to independent counsel
in the US). Such officials should be elected by the National Assembly to
fulfil certain functions (e.g. to investigate inside corruption in the
Judiciary) or ad hoc, and they should enjoy the immunity of magistrates.
Their powers should relate to investigation, bringing and maintaining
indictments in cases strictly listed in the Constitution.
As long as the Prosecutor General is currently not bound to report to
anyone, and his accountability, including that to the National Assembly,
solely depends on his willingness, it is compelling to insert in the
Constitution the principle of regular and ad hoc reporting by the
Prosecutor General to the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and to enable
a reasonably defined number of members of SJC to seek lifting his
immunity in exhaustively enumerated circumstances.
l As regards immunity, the constitutional solution should be based on a
general review of the immunity provided to a wider spectrum of
individuals (Members of Parliament, members of the Constitutional
Court, individuals in senior positions in the Executive). In addition,
the limitation of the immunity of magistrates by transforming it into a
functional immunity (i.e. for acts undertaken in their official capacity,
as opposed to their private endeavors and steps outside the context of
their direct activities) should not be isolated from the rest of the
reforms. Unless there are thorough guarantees and well-thought
procedures and mechanisms, any hasty decision could entail the
opposite effects, e.g. unreasonable persecution, pressure, defamation,
obstructing the fulfilment of the functions of justice and investigation.
Therefore, it is worth analyzing the opinion of magistrates the majority
of whom (49.3 per cent) do not believe that the move to a functional
immunity would reduce corruption in the Judiciary, compared to 37.2
per cent supporting the idea and 13.4 per cent without an opinion on
the matter3.
The future constitutional solution possibly extending the number of
persons able to make a reasoned request for lifting the immunity of
magistrates should provide for a reasonably determined number of
3 Source: CMS of Coalition 2000.
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members of SJC able to seek that, and should be linked to the possible
introduction of a public official empowered by the law to perform
prosecutorial functions or to a team of such officials outside the
hierarchical system of public prosecution in its present form. This would
make it possible to overcome not only the monopoly of the Prosecutor
General to initiate the lifting of immunity but also his monopoly over the
prosecutorial  function and over the subsequent monitoring of
investigation. In implementation of the constitutional principle that all
are equal before the law, the Constitution should also tackle the immunity
of the Prosecutor General so as to do away with the perception that he is
unapproachable.
The introduction of a higher quorum for the lifting of immunity should
be given careful consideration.
l It is indispensable to adjust the principle of absolute irremovability.
The Constitution should lay down the general parameters, the content
of and the correctives to irremovability, and these should be further
specified by the legislation by defining clear criteria and rules, together
with the specific conditions for obtaining or losing the status of
irremovability. It is proposed that irremovability should only benefit
magistrates who efficiently work in the authorities of the Judiciary (i.e.
it should not apply at times where those individuals occupy elected
positions such as Members of Parliament, mayors, or where they are
on leave). Likewise, the time period that has to lapse before a magistrate
becomes eligible for irremovability should be longer, the eligibility
requirements should become stricter, and there should be a higher
quorum for depriving a magistrate from that status. The principle should
be expressly proclaimed that irremovabil i ty does not imply
irremovability from the managerial position occupied.
l A constitutional principle of terms of office should be introduced for
the presidents of courts and for the heads of prosecution offices and
of investigation services, similar to the principle of terms of office for
the presidents of the two supreme courts and the Prosecutor General.
It is suggested that those terms should not be in excess of four or five
years. Regular alternation of the managerial approach would bar the
possible degradation  of the mentality of termless leaders and the
rooting of corrupt practices. It would also influence positively the
aspirations of a larger number of magistrates to occupy managerial
positions. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the proposal to
introduce a special procedure for an earlier termination of office
which should develop on substantive grounds defined in the
Constitution.
Restricting absolute irremovability and introducing terms of office
The proposed amendments that are most welcomed concern the
reduction of absolute irremovability for magistrates and the
introduction of terms of office for magistrates in managerial
positions. These proposals are designed as tools to combat
corruption in the Judiciary and to prevent political appointments
in the courts. The fact that over 80 per cent of the lawyers
interviewed are supportive of such amendments is a recognition
that such problems exist in the Judiciary and serious preventative
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action is called for ... Also largely supported is the proposal to
confine immunity solely to the actions magistrates undertake in
court. This is also geared towards thwarting the sense of impunity
among magistrates and Members of Parliament.
Sources: National Public Opinion Center with the National Assembly
l Special attention should be given to the hierarchical relationships inside
the different systems - superior magistrates should control and monitor
magistrates at lower levels only by way of providing methodological
instructions and without any interference in the resolution of cases,
let alone any unlawful pressure from top to bottom.
l The number of instances in court proceedings should be revisited as
well and two-instance proceedings should be introduced for some or
for all categories of criminal and civil cases. As the detailed rules should
be listed in the criminal and civil codes of procedure, the specific
proposals are set out in Parts Two and Three of this Program.
2.2. Ensuring professional and corruption-free management of the
Judiciary
To effectively combat corruption, the management of the Judiciary should
be streamlined to the optimum extent. Likewise, the functions and the
powers of the Supreme Judicial Council, being the body of the Judiciary
in charge of recruiting magistrates and providing for the organization of
the system, and of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), as an executive authority,
need to be distinguished between and redefined.
The Supreme Judicial Council is endowed with the key representative
and advisory functions in the Judiciary and with extensive powers as to
the administration of the judicial system. Its operation suffers serious
deficiencies some of which are predetermined by the approach of the
Constitution to the composition, duties and powers of SJC. Others, though,
may be rectified even within the existing constitutional framework.
Those drawbacks are most generally attributed to the lack of transparency
(even with respect to the structures of the Judiciary itself), the incidental
nature of its work, the lack of clear procedures for some of its activities
and the inadequate internal regulations, the insufficient administrative
capacity, and the non-existing feedback from the bodies of the Judiciary.
Required measures for the institution-building of SJC
- developing its capacity to fulfil the duties inherently linked to
the administration of the Judiciary: strategy, staffing policy,
including selection, appointments, evaluation, acquiring and
lifting the magistrates irremovability, financial issues;
- putting in place a well-developed system of rules and
regulations governing the operation and the administration of
the Judiciary, including norms on the suppression of corruption;
- promoting the openness and transparency of SJCs work;
- detailing SJCs powers in the context of disciplinary cases against
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magistrates, and ensuring the fully-fledged exercise of those
powers;
- developing an information system for co-ordination and control;
- improving the internal rules on the proceedings of SJC, including
decision-making procedures;
- establishing a dialogue and co-operation with the Executive and
the Legislature, especially in view of addressing the problems of
the Judiciary;
- bringing the status and the formation of SJC in line with any
possible adjustments to or future changes in the structure of the
Judiciary.
The possible changes in the status of SJC, its powers and formation
(number of members, election and term of office, eligibility criteria) must
be effected through the Constitution and should be carefully considered
and connected with the possible future changes in the structure of the
Judiciary. Along these lines, it is worth noting and examining further the
following suggestions:
l The possibility
that SJC members be
elected solely by the
branches of the Judi-
ciary which nominate
a member of the Judi-
ciary as president. The
president should be
elected by the Na-
tional Assembly and
report to the Assembly
regularly or ad hoc.
That structure matches
the proposal to have
the President of the
Supreme Court of Cas-
sation, President of
the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court and the
Prosecutor General
elected by the Na-
tional Assembly. This
would indeed deprive
the Parliament from
having a say in the
composition of SJC
but the Parl iament
would still have its role
in operating the mu-
tual checks and bal-
ances among the
branches of power.
Quite a few magis-
%
Yes 61.2
No 30.2
Does not know / No response 8.6
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
DOES MORE EFFICIENT SUPPRESSION OF CORRUPTION IN THE
AUTHORITIES OF THE JUDICIARY NECESSITATE REFORMS IN THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL?
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
WHAT ARE THE REFORMS NEEDED IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COUNCIL?
Yes
Change in the manner of forming SJC 60.8
Promoting wider transparency and openness
in the work of SJC 54.0
Extending SJCs powers / enhancing its capacity in disciplinary
proceedings against magistrates 37.4
Strengthening SJCs administrative and
managerial capacity 19.1
Building up a control and co-ordination information system 48.2
Other 4.3
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trates believe that, if the parliamentary quota is to persist, such elec-
tions should be by a qualified majority.
The prevailing number of magistrates recognize the need for reforms in
SJC with a view to more efficiently combating corruption in the Judiciary
(61.2 per cent). Some of the required changes that have been identified
concern the way in which SJC is composed, including the abolition of the
parliamentary quota, the promotion of wider transparency and openness
in the work of SJC, the extension of its powers and capacity in disciplin-
ary proceedings, the implementation of a system of control and co-ordi-
nation, etc.
l Transforming the Supreme Judicial Council into a permanent body
with reduced membership in view of making its work more operational
and efficient. The reasons in support of that proposal state that under
the existing pattern (SJC meets once a week) much of the meeting
time is used for staff matters rather than for discussing other, major
problems faced by the system of justice. This, in the end of the day,
affects the very process of selecting members of the Judiciary as there
is no time to inquire into the nominations made and every proposal
submitted by a president of a district court is in fact voted on tel-quel.
The arguments against such a change emphasize that the best
magistrates would not give up their work to become SJC members
and to get stuck in its operation, that SJC members may risk to see
their professional aptitude weakening, that the isolation of the Judiciary
from the other two powers could be deepened and its administration
could become more bureaucratic, etc.
It is beyond doubt, however that changes are needed in the status of SJC
members who must be independent of their superiors and able to uphold
fair and substantiated views in their work at SJC.
l The supervisory powers of SJC should also be developed so as to
cover the essence of the work of the Judiciary. Special attention should
be attached to the powers of SJC to make recommendations, including
to the Supreme Court of Cassation to provide interpretation if that is
needed to make court case-law consistent.
To co-ordinate the management of the Judiciary and to ensure its
independence, it is particularly important to devise a mechanism whereby
the Judiciary and the Executive would interact but remain clearly separate,
based on the interaction and distinction between their administrative
bodies. The powers of SJC should focus on the management and
administration of the Judiciary. Any extension beyond that remit may
well entail a duplication in the functions of SJC and the Ministry of Justice
and finally make one of the two institutions redundant. At the same time,
the reinforcement of the independence of the Judiciary necessitates a
careful refinement of the functions of SJC and of the Inspectorate with
MoJ, of the interaction between them. The managerial powers of the
Executive, i.e. the Ministry of Justice, vis-à-vis the Judiciary, should be
confined to providing the organization and equipment indispensable for
its effective operation (i.e. MoJ should check the progress of cases,
unjustified delays, unwarranted remittal of cases and the like, while fully
refraining from any interference with the merits of the cases; contribute
to the additional qualification of magistrates; manage and maintain the
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buildings; provide the needed equipment and materials; provide for
security staff and facilities, etc.).
2.3. Anti-corruption measures to promote the status of magistrates
Putting in place a sustainable anti-corruption environment for the
operation of the Judiciary requires not only changes that would
democratize its administration but also measures aimed at:
l enhancing the responsibility of individual magistrates;
l refining the access to the profession of magistrates;
l improving the qualification and enhancing public control;
l introducing elections and terms of office for managerial positions in
the Judiciary;
l refining the powers of SJC;
l making the competitions for access to the profession of magistrates
dependent on clear criteria that exclude any improper acts;
l providing rules on the professional qualification of magistrates;
l improving the procedure of disciplining magistrates, inter alia by
introducing summary procedures for some cases.
Many of the magistrates interviewed are in favor of such changes.
As regards the compe-
titions for becoming a
member of the Judi-
ciary and the evalua-
tions of magistrates
before they become
irremovable or before
their promotion in po-
sition or in rank, it is
of the essence for SJC
to organize and moni-
tor the rigorous and
transparent / corrup-
tion-free implementa-
tion of any new rules.
Otherwise they would
be pointless and only
serve as a shell for the
reform.
It is necessary to bring
the rules on profes-
sional ethics, which
have been or are to be
adopted by the organizations of the legal professions and approved by
SJC, more into line with the requirements for professionalism, with the
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
MEASURES TO BE UNDERTAKEN TO CURB CORRUPTION WITHIN
THE JUDICIARY
Yes (%)
Increasing the salaries of magistrates/ court clerks 69.4
Introducing more stringent criteria for the selection of magistrates 68.7
Making changes in the structure of the Judiciary and providing
wider opportunities for accountability,
monitoring and disciplining 35.0
Introducing regular evaluations of professional performance and linking the
career development of magistrates with the result of such evaluations 32.8
Introducing an efficient system to improve the professional
qualification of magistrates 33.9
Encouraging magistrates to report to the public on any deficiencies
in the work they have come across 25.1
Other 4.4
Does not know / No response 0.7
19
definition of offences and with the corresponding statutory mechanisms
for monitoring and disciplining.
The laws should also determine the nature of the employment
relationship in which a magistrate is involved, i.e. is it really employment
or is it a civil service relationship. Rules should be provided to settle the
disputes in this area which have arisen in recent years in practice, as well
as in legal theory.
2.3.1. Selection and appointment criteria applicable to magistrates
The staffing policy in the Judiciary needs to be carefully revisited - both
as regards the initial election of magistrates and as regards their promotion
in the same position or hierarchically, while inter alia ensuring a more
balanced representation of both genders within the community of
magistrates. The current widespread practice of the presidents of the
respective courts or prosecution offices to make a sole proposal (i.e. submit
a single nomination) more often than not results in subjectivity, lobby
pressures and other unlawful influences. Therefore:
l the principle of competition should be the only one when a magistrate
is to take a position at a higher instance or to be moved to another job
or another town. The first step was made with the first centralized
competition for the appointment of junior judges held at the end of
2002 on grounds of the Interim Regulations issued by SJC. Ordinance
No. 1 laying down the conditions and the procedure for carrying out
competitions for magistrates adopted by SJC provides for that every
applicant for a magistrate position should sit for a written and oral
exam, and these requirements should be abided by consistently and
objectively. To ensure maximum objectivity, transparency and stability
in this area, the principle of competition and the guarantees for its
observance should be envisaged in the law;
l applicants for the Judiciary should undergo a careful scrutiny for, inter
alia, their mental fitness and character so that different forms of
dependence or negative features could be barred (suggestibility,
instability, etc.). The existence of any kinship or other connections or
interests should also be taken into consideration, if that is likely to
produce a conflict of interests or any privileges.
2.3.2. Mechanisms of control of the activities of magistrates. Evaluation
The efficient administration of justice depends to the highest extent on
the competence and professionalism of magistrates but this does not imply
that no control is possible of their work. The review of court acts by higher
instances is not sufficient to achieve a lasting improvement of the system
of justice and fails to contribute essentially to bettering the competence
and the qualification of magistrates. It is therefore compelling to devise
and start implementing mechanisms for reviewing the work of magistrates,
other than the review of court judgments by higher instances.
l It is necessary to expand the rules on evaluation which were
introduced by the 2002 amendments to the Law on the Judiciary by
setting up a permanent body with SJC referred to as an Evaluation
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4 Similar legislative approaches to the evaluation of magistrates work, as a mechanism of public and professional scrutiny
of the judicial system, exist in France, Italy and other European countries.
Commission. That body should assess the work of magistrates regularly
(every two years), upon the expiry of the term for obtaining guaranteed
tenure and upon any nomination for promotion in rank or in salary or
in position. The composition of that Commission (number of members,
which professional groups they should belong to, etc.) and the
mechanism for its formation that should guarantee its independence
should be laid down in law in clear and stable terms4.
Proposed evaluation procedure
The evaluation of a magistrate should be set in motion by an
interview of the competent authority under s.30, Law on the
Judiciary, with the magistrate being evaluated. Thereafter, the
authority under s.30 would draft a written opinion where it shall
describe the magistrates work, provide an overall assessment of
the interviewee, list the functions and activities that the magistrate
can successfully perform, and determine, if necessary, the need for
any additional training. The opinion should be accompanied by a
written presentation by the magistrate in which he or she would
describe the work performed, the types of cases he or she has been
involved in, and any forms of training they have undergone.
After the magistrate becomes familiar with the assessment of his or
her professional activity drawn up by the authority under s. 30,
they may refer the matter, within a reasonable time limit to be set
by SJC, to the Evaluation Commission if they disagree with the
assessment made. Where the specific circumstances so dictate, the
Commission would appoint an official review of the assessment.
The Commission would also be empowered to appoint such a
review wherever the circumstances of the case evoke a reasonable
doubt that the evaluation was not objective or justified. The
Commission shall serve the above documents, representing the
evaluation, on the magistrate who would be able to appeal before
SJC. SJC would then pass a decision upholding or modifying the
evaluation.
The final evaluation of the Commission would be enclosed to the
magistrates personal file.
The work of any junior judge (prosecutor) should be evaluated under
the general rules and a positive assessment should result in
nominating the person in question for a regional (first-tier) judge or
prosecutor.
An appropriate procedure should also be provided for the
evaluation of investigators if the system of investigation is to remain
part of the Judiciary.
l All decisions concerning the professional career of magistrates,
including their evaluation, should be based on objective criteria listed
in the Law on the Judiciary. Recommendation No. R/94/12 of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States of the Council of Europe on the
Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges of 13 October 1994 is along
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these lines. The Law on the Judiciary should include the following
indicators that should be used as evaluation criteria in respect of
magistrates:
- competence, which should cover elements such as the quality of
work, the number of cases closed, and promptness;
- integrity;
- experience, based on the length of professional record and on
qualification;
- willingness to improve ones professional knowledge and skills by
way of additional specialized training.
2.4. Internal anti-corruption monitoring mechanisms within the
bodies of the Judiciary and at other institutions linked to the operation
of the Judiciary. Introducing an efficient system of reporting
The importance of in-house anti-corruption monitoring mechanisms in
the Judiciary cannot be questioned. This is also true for the institutions
whose operation is linked to the work of courts, investigation services
and prosecution offices, e.g. the Bar and the Ministry of Interior, as corrupt
practices there could export corruption to the Judiciary or fuel chain
corruption that is hard to detect.
It is noteworthy that magistrates identify the lack of an efficient internal
monitoring and sanctions machinery as the fourth most important factor
benefiting the spread of corruption in the Judiciary.
The majority of magis-
trates believe that set-
ting up specialized
units within the Su-
preme Prosecution
Office of Cassation, in
courts, in the investi-
gation and in the Min-
istry of Interior to in-
quire into reported in-
side corruption, and
the promotion of such
units would help re-
duce corruption in the
Judiciary.
To curb inside corrup-
tion in the Judiciary
and to resist the di-
verse forms of chain
corruption, the follow-
ing measures are rec-
ommended:
l Putting specialized units in place within SJC, the courts, with the
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
FACTORS BENEFITING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY
(PER CENT)
Low salaries of magistrates / court clerks 55.3
Moral crisis during the period of transition 43.2
Imperfect legislation 36.1
Lack of efficient internal monitoring and sanctions mechanism 35.7
Interweaving between the official duties of magistrates
and their private interests 31.1
Aspiration toward quick enrichment 25.1
Political connections and dependence of magistrates / court clerks 16.1
Sense of unapproachability / immunity 15.0
Other 2.6
Does not know / No response 4.2
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
CORRUPTION-REDUCING POTENTIAL OF SOME MEASURES IN THE
JUDICIARY (PER CENT)
Yes No Does not know/
No response
Setting up a specialized unit within the structure of the
Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation to inquire
into alleged instances of corruption 49.6 39.6 10.8
Setting up similar units to inquire into alleged
instances of corruption in the courts 48.7 41.0 10.4
Setting up similar units to inquire into alleged instances
of corruption in the investigation 46.0 42.7 11.2
Setting up similar units to inquire into alleged instances
of corruption in the bodies of MoI 48.0 40.5 11.5
leaderships of the
public prosecution
and of the investiga-
tion in charge of pre-
venting and combat-
ing corruption in the
Judicia0ry. There
should be an obliga-
tion to gather statis-
tics for corruption-
related offences com-
mitted by magis-
trates.
l Introducing an effi-
cient system of regu-
lar reporting aimed at
enhancing the work of
the authorit ies and
units of the Judiciary and of any other institutions whose day-to-day
work is connected with the functioning of the Judiciary. It is also in-
tended to promote transparency, due account being taken of the speci-
ficity of every sphere of activity. Regular reporting (monthly, quar-
terly) to SJC through the leaderships of court, prosecutorial and inves-
tigative authorities should rely on trustworthy statistics gathered by
those authorities and by MoI, on uniform criteria and on a unified
information system. After the reporting mechanisms and procedures
have been regulated by law, secondary legislation should provide for
the mandatory indicators to be used in gathering and maintaining sta-
tistics, and set out the
procedure for their
systematizing and cen-
tralization.
l In addition to the
decisive legislative
amendments to be
made (introducing
stricter criteria for ac-
cess to the profession
of attorney, expanding
the scope of statutory
duties of every attor-
ney who should com-
ply with a number of
ethical rules in order
to uphold the trust
and respect neces-
sary for the profes-
sion to exist, refining
the disciplinary pro-
ceedings for failure to
fulfil the statutory du-
ties and the ethics
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
METHODS USED BY INTERESTED PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT
CORRUPT PRACTICES
Personally
12,1%
Through 
magistrates’ 
friends and 
relatives
10,6%
Through other 
magistrates
9%
Through attorneys
41,6%
Other
2,4%
Does not know / 
No answer
24,2%
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code), specific guarantees would be necessary for the observance of
professional ethics and discipline on behalf of attorneys, and that ob-
ligation of attorneys should even be proclaimed in the Constitu-
tion. The debate on the anti-corruption dimensions of judicial reform
has revealed the ever more prevailing opinion that some members of
the Bar at times facilitate the spread of corrupt practices in the judi-
cial system and in the public administration by acting as intermediar-
ies or by deriving unlawful benefits under the pretext of pretended
corrupt intermediation.
The seriousness of that problem in that particular case derives not only
from the unlawful and morally reproachful conduct of such attorneys but
especially from its consequences which contribute to a real growth of
corruption among magistrates and civil servants - the fundamental symbols
of statehood and of the public opinion of statehood. To counter those
adverse trends, the bodies of the Bar should apply stricter controls.
l It is also high time to regulate the status of in-house lawyers working
at government agencies or at private legal entities. It would suffice to
have a general Constitutional provision similar to that on members of
the Bar, taking account of the proposed amendments, and the detailed
rules should be contained in a special law.
2.5. Suggested options for restructuring the Judiciary
It would be a self-evident possibility to endeavor to suppress corruption
in the Judiciary, while preserving the current structure of the third power
with some adjustments. In addition, two alternative options are suggested
for discussion that entail essential structural changes. Should any of those
alternatives, or some of their elements, be approved, the fundamental
organizational principles of the Judiciary should be fully preserved with
respect to those bodies that will remain part thereof, and should be
accordingly modified with respect to the bodies that will move to the
Executive. In the event of any structural changes, the functions of managing
and administering the Judiciary should be clearly set apart from any other
function.
First option
l Judiciary (court and prosecution)
The Constitutional model of the Judiciary should comprise the authorities
that administer justice, i.e. the courts, plus the prosecution offices. With
respect to judges and prosecutors, the principles of independence,
functional immunity, and irremovability should apply, though under
stricter conditions and criteria than before. While in that case public
prosecution will form part of the Judiciary, it is mandatory to implement
the principle of regular reporting and ad hoc reporting by the
Judiciary
Prosecution OfficeCourts Investigation
Executive
Ministry of Interior
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Prosecutor General to SJC, and a reasonably determined number of SJC
members should be given the right to seek to lift the immunity of the
Prosecutor General under circumstances listed exhaustively.
In addition, in the context of the proposals to decentralize the system of
public prosecution and to introduce the position of public officials
entrusted by law with prosecutorial functions (with respect to instances
of inside corruption in the Judiciary or ad hoc) outside the system of the
Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative
Prosecution Office, the appellate, district and regional prosecution offices,
it is suggested to discuss whether prosecutors from the system of public
prosecution could work in the specialized authorities carrying out
investigation at the Ministry of Interior or outside MoI (e.g. National
Service for Combating Organized Crime, Financial Intelligence Agency,
customs authorities, etc.). This matter should be governed in more detail
by relevant acts of Parliament.
l Investigation
Under this option, the National Investigation Service (NIS) should be
preserved but should move to the Ministry of Interior and have the status
of a specialized service there. The head of NIS should be appointed by
the Minister of Interior for a term of office exceeding that of the
Government. In particular, it is suggested that investigators should exercise
their functions in the structure of NIS either directly or at the
corresponding district services of MoI / at the specialized structures in
charge of some investigations outside the system of MoI (e.g. National
Service for Combating Organized Crime, Financial Intelligence Agency,
customs authorities, etc.), under conditions laid down by the leadership
of NIS (a collective governing body composed of the head of NIS, a Deputy
Minister of MoI and three investigators elected by the community of
investigators in the country). All investigators should be directly
subordinate to the leadership of NIS. As to the day-to-day work of
investigators, their independence of the structures of MoI or of any other
authorities to which they are attached should be guaranteed, as should
be their lead role in the investigation conducted by such authorities.
The idea behind the change proposed above is to ensure the required
immediate link between the police authorities which detect crime, and
the investigative authorities - a link that is sadly missing from the current
framework. The organizational link between police and investigative
authorities within the same institutional mechanism would enable the
formation of joint teams of investigation and benefit interaction
throughout the process of investigation. The police would thus be
responsible for the final result (a successful completion of the
investigation), whereas the investigative authorities as a major unit of MoI
would be involved more actively in the fight against and the prevention
of crime, and would provide immediate assistance to police inspectors
with their knowledge and experience.
The division of competencies and the relations between investigators and
prosecutors, including the powers of the public prosecution vis-à-vis the
investigation, should also be carefully re-examined and specifically
regulated by the procedural rules.
In future, one may think about abolishing the investigation and fully
entrusting the operational activities to the police. In that scenario some
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police officers could be assigned with carrying out the urgent investigative
steps that would produce fit evidence.
This having been said, any change in the investigative function and in the
underlying structure should be undertaken in the context of a well-thought
reform in criminal proceedings, while taking due account of the need to
strictly distinguish between and regulate the powers, the duties and the
responsibilities of the authorities involved in that process, and to root the
relations in which they engage in a sound and unambiguous legislative
basis.
Second option
l Judiciary (the courts)
The Constitutional model of the Judiciary should only comprise those
authorities that administer justice, i.e. the courts. The principles of
independence, functional immunity, and irremovability would only apply
to judges, subject to stricter requirements and criteria.
As regards the investigative and prosecutorial authorities, and the exercise
of investigative and prosecutorial functions respectively, it is proposed
that the legislation should introduce the following organizational and
institutional changes (after the Constitution has been amended
accordingly):
l Public prosecution
A National Prosecution Office should be set up within the Ministry of
Justice5 . Within the framework of that Office, a Managing and
Administrative Board, or a High Council for Prosecutors should be
created (more or less similar to the Supreme Judicial Council) to include
the Prosecutor General as the head of the Prosecution Office, three
prosecutors elected by the community of prosecutors and having terms
of office equal to the term of office of the Prosecutor General, and the
Judiciary
Prosecution OfficeCourts Investigation
Executive
Ministry of Justice
Executive
Ministry of Interior
5 Public prosecution in many countries forms part, in one way or another, of the structure of the Ministry of Justice. In
Austria, prosecutors with first instance courts are subordinate to superior prosecutors who, along with the Prosecutor
General with the Supreme Court, are subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Justice. Public Prosecution in Belgium has a
dual nature as prosecutors represent at the same time the Judiciary and the Executive. The Prosecutor General with the
Supreme Court of Cassation has a prosecutorial function only in cases that are resolved on the merits by that court. The
Prosecutor General with the Supreme Court of Cassation is assisted by prosecutors. The prosecutors general with the
courts of appeal, who are also assisted by prosecutors of various ranks, support the indictment in all cases before the
different courts coming within the territorial jurisdiction of the respective court of appeal. The prosecutors-general of all
courts of appeal form a board which is subordinate to the Minister of Justice. Public prosecution in Denmark is subordinate
to the Ministry of Justice. Public Prosecution in the Netherlands has three levels: with the Supreme Court, with the
courts of appeal and with the district and regional courts. All prosecutors, save for those with the Supreme Court, are
subordinate to the Minister of Justice. Public prosecutors in Spain are managed by a Prosecutor Generals Office which is
outside the Judiciary, and the Prosecutor General is elected by the Government. Public prosecution in Poland forms part
of the structure of the Ministry of Justice and the Minister of Justice acts as a Prosecutor General. In the Czech Republic,
prosecutors are appointed by the Minister of Justice, whereas the Prosecutor General is appointed by the Government on
a proposal from the Minister of Justice. The experience of Hungary deviates somewhat from that trend as the Prosecutor
General is elected by the Parliament on a proposal from the President of Hungary and reports to the Parliament.
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Minister of Justice (by operation of law). To avoid the threat of the
Executive taking the lead with respect to the Prosecution Office and its
governing body, the Prosecutor General should be nominated by the
Minister of Justice but elected by the National Assembly for a specific
term of office (longer than 4 years), and the National Assembly again
should have the power to remove him from office under conditions strictly
provided for in the Constitution.
The Prosecutor General should report to the National Assembly regularly
(annually) and ad hoc. That structure, where the public prosecution would
be a separate institution with the Legislature or in the Executive but the
Prosecutor General would be elected by and accountable to the
Legislature, is expected to result in a more balanced separation of powers
and in a refined mechanism of checks and balances.
The new Office should comprise all prosecution offices existing at present
plus the prosecutors working in the specialized authorities in charge of
investigations inside or outside the Ministry of Interior (e.g. National
Service for Combating Organized Crime, Financial Intelligence Agency,
customs authorities, etc.) if this proposal is implented.
The Managing and Administrative Board/High Council for Prosecutors
should handle the staffing of, and provide methodological guidance to,
the prosecution offices and the prosecutors or public officials with
prosecutorial functions working outside the Prosecution Service. Public
prosecutors should be independent, enjoy functional immunity and obey
only the laws when performing their basic functions. That would be
necessary to avoid any risk of interference by the Ministry of Interior or
by any other authority where prosecutors fulfil their duties.
l Investigation
In that respect, the proposal is the same as in the first option, i.e. the
investigation should be moved to the system of MoI.
2.6. Constitutional regulation of out-of-court mechanisms concern-
ing the rights of citizens and the better functioning of the Judiciary
2.6.1. The institution of the Ombudsman
In a number of countries, the institution of the ombudsman has proven
its potential and role in resisting corruption and preventing the violations
of human rights by using out-of-court tools, thus inter alia substantially
relieving the courts from some of their workload (especially from
administrative cases). Practice has shown that in order for such an
institution to be more effective and to enjoy independence and efficient
powers, it should better be provided for in the Constitution of the country.
That way, the ombudsman could be elected by a qualified majority and
be endowed with the right to legislative initiative and to make references
to the Constitutional Court. All these objectives could not be attained by
way of ordinary legislation.
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2.6.2. Individual constitutional complaints and proposed changes in the
formation of the Constitutional Court
Another issue deserving of discussion is whether individual citizens should
be given the right to lodge complaints with the Constitutional Court. It is
not really necessary to replicate the successful foreign examples, e.g. those
of Germany or Spain. In the circumstances, in Bulgaria it might be more
appropriate to enable individuals to refer grievances indirectly, e.g. via
an authority entitled to seize the Constitutional Court. Given the expected
introduction of the institution of an ombudsman in the Constitution, with
the powers described above, it may prove suitable for the ombudsman
to act as a sui generis intermediary between the citizens and the
Constitutional Court in cases where the intervention of the ombudsman
has not yielded results or if it is clear from the outset that the Constitutional
Court should be involved. As the ombudsman would specialize in
protecting fundamental rights, he or she would be the most appropriate
shield against the unwarranted flooding of the Constitutional Court with
a vast number of complaints.
In order to further promote the role of the Constitutional Court as a
guardian of the constitutional consensus and a guarantor for compliance
with the Constitution, it is proposed to consider a possible change in the
formation of that authority: the current quota-based principle should be
replaced with the principle that the members of the Constitutional Court
should be elected solely by the National Assembly by the same qualified
majority which is required to pass the Constitution (the involvement of
the Judiciary and of the President would be preserved as they would be
able to nominate some members of the Constitutional Court). A solution
along these lines would help boost the independence of the Constitutional
Court and would serve as a guarantee against the possible politicization
of its work.
2.6.3. Methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
The excessive workload of the courts often results in delaying the
pronouncement or compromising the quality of justice, and in resorting
to corrupt techniques to speed up the procedure. Regretfully, alternative
dispute resolution is not widely used yet. In countries with established
democratic traditions and well functioning systems of justice, some 40 to
60 per cent of the disputes are settled by way of ADR. In those countries,
ADR methods have not only become part and parcel of administrative
justice but are also widely used in civil, criminal and labor cases.
Most magistrates in Bulgaria believe that the use of alternative dispute
resolution would help
reduce corruption in
the Judiciary.
The courts should be
freed from dealing
with disputes that may
be handled more
speedily by arbitrators
or through mediators.
This philosophy un-Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
CORRUPTION-REDUCING POTENTIAL OF SOME MEASURES IN THE
JUDICIARY (PER CENT)
Yes No Does not know/
No response
Use of methods of alternative dispute resolution 52.2 33.3 14.5
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derlies the measures to promote the peaceful out-of-court resolution of
disputes prior to or in the course of court proceedings, listed in Recom-
mendation No. R (86) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope to Member States Concerning Measures to Prevent and Reduce the Exces-
sive Workload in the Courts of 16 September 1986. The Recommendation is
based on the understanding that to improve the administration of justice, it
is necessary to limit the number of non-judicial tasks falling on the shoulders of
judges, and also to reduce any workload of the courts. An Annex to the rec-
ommendation provides an indicative list of non-judicial tasks from which
judges could be relieved, depending on domestic peculiarities and fea-
tures. These include a number of issues of family and commercial law
and, inter alia, the keeping of commercial and land registers.
To promote the methods of out-of-court dispute resolution that are more
easily accessible, efforts should be made to raise the public awareness
thereof, and to include more detailed rules on them both in the legislation
in force and in the Constitution.
II. REFORM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUDICIAL BODIES
Good organization of the work of magistrates, generally referred to as
administration of judicial bodies, is crucial for the successful suppres-
sion of corruption and for ensuring the efficient operation of the Judi-
ciary. The concept covers the administration of the following bodies:
Supreme Judicial Council, Supreme Court of Cassation, Supreme Admin-
istrative Court, Prosecutor General, Supreme Prosecution Office of Cas-
sation, Supreme Administrative Prosecution Office, National Investiga-
tion Service, and all the courts, prosecution offices and investigation ser-
vices. The term is used
to denote the system
of structures intended
to support the work of
magistrates and to stay
in contact with citi-
zens seeking the inter-
vention of the Judi-
ciary, as well as with
other institutions that
interact with the Judi-
ciary.
The organization and
the work of the admin-
istration of judicial
bodies, hereinafter re-
ferred to as court ad-
ministration, are
linked to the manage-
ment of the Judiciary
and to the mecha-
nisms guaranteeing its
independence and
self-governance. On
the one hand, the per-
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SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AMONG COURT CLERKS AT THE
BRANCH WHERE RESPONDENT MAGISTRATES WORK
%
Almost all court clerks are involved in corruption 0.2
Most court clerks are involved in corruption 2.2
A few court clerks are involved in corruption 18.7
Almost no court clerks are involved in corruption 32.4
No court clerks at all are involved in corruption 30.0
Does not know / no response 16.5
sisting problems in the administration of the Judiciary and corruption in
its branches largely precondition the shortcomings of court administra-
tion. On the other hand, the malfunction of court administration and the
corrupt practices involving court clerks bear directly upon the quality of
work of judicial bodies and affect adversely the public opinion about the
judicial branch of power. There is a very impressive discrepancy between
the opinions of the population and the views of magistrates when it comes
to the spread of corruption among the employees working in the admin-
istration of judicial bodies whom the legislation refers to as court clerks.
Although growing attention has been attached in recent years to the need
to reform court administration, the efforts made so far have materialized
primarily in the drafting of strategic and programmatic documents. Even
today, court administration remains founded on obsolete organizational
principles, clerks op-
erate in unsuitable,
frequently primitive,
conditions of work, no
unified standards or
practices exist, and the
system is generally far
from modern manage-
ment technologies.
There are no uniform
and detailed rules of
secondary legislation
regulating the opera-
tion of administrations
in the courts, prosecu-
tion offices or investi-
gation services.
Corruption-generating problems in the organization and operation of court ad-
ministration
The current organization of work of court administration, the extremely
poor setting in which the bodies of the Judiciary, and their administra-
tions, operate, the scarce budget of the Judiciary and, hence, the low
pay of court clerks, produce an environment conducive to corrupt acts.
The latter, in turn, could result in delaying or obstructing investigation
and court proceedings, including the investigation and prosecution of
corruption offences. Irrespective of the prevailing opinion of magistrates
about a low degree of corruption among court clerks in general, most
magistrates are able to identify the specific objectives of corrupt acts,
and only 7.7 per cent believe that no corruption exists in that group.
The following could be identified as major problems relating to the orga-
nization and work of court administration:
l case management procedures and insufficient control of document
management within the branches of the Judiciary
Case management procedures (most generally those relative to the filing
and receipt of papers with and from the court and the prosecution, ac-
cess to information, the security of document circulation, the progress of
court cases) are typically opaque, awkward and subjective. Under those
conditions, myriad unpredictable local administrative practices emerge
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which frustrate even
more the efficient ad-
ministration of justice
and sow the seeds of
distrust of the Judi-
ciary. Such practices
eat up much of the
time and efforts of
judges, and of the in-
sufficient number of
court clerks most of
whom are not well
trained and lack moti-
vation.
No clear rules exist on
the access to docu-
ments and records in
courts, investigation services and prosecution offices, on the issuance of
documents and the delivery of copies by the court, on how the files should
be accessed and used, or who should be held liable for the disappear-
ance or destruction of individual documents or parts of files.
l summonsing procedures
The incorrect, inaccurate or late serving of writs of summons and the
errors possibly contained therein can turn into major factors contributing
to dawdling the cases and manipulating the process.
No remedy is available against the inaccurate serving of summonses - for
example, a writ of summons may be served on and accepted by a neighbor
to the party to a case; thereafter the neighbor in question might fail, for
purely objective reasons, to deliver the writ to the party summoned; as a
result that party would fail to appear in court and crucial time limits would
lapse but the court would accept that the party was duly summoned.
l assignment of cases to individual judges and court chambers
The assignment of cases to individual judges or to different court chambers
is not always well-founded, adequate and objective. Objective criteria,
such as qualification, experience and workload, are not used often enough
to decide on the assignment of cases and files. This paves, directly or
indirectly, the way for corrupt practices. Not only citizens, but magistrates
as well are typically convinced that if a specific outcome is sought for a
case, that case would be assigned to specific chambers or judge-
rapporteurs - for instance, the practice exists for the presidents of courts
to assign cases involving well-known personalities or large companies to
magistrates trusted by the respective president so that they would decide
in line with the instructions received.
On the other hand, the assignment of cases is not always reasonable,
justified or adequate in terms of the number of cases assigned or the
complexity of the matter. Inappropriate assignment, however, may result
in some judges being overworked while others are unduly relieved. More
often than not, more work is assigned to those magistrates who work
more, better and more expeditiously, rather than to those lawyers who
have poorer qualification or are slower.
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
CORRUPT PRACTICES (E.G. OFFERING BRIBES, TRAFFIC
IN INFLUENCE, ETC.) ARE EXERTED ON COURT CLERKS FOR
THE FOLLOWING PURPOSES:
Court clerks Yes %
To carry out / to refrain from carrying out specific steps in processing court
papers and documents 55.9
To knowingly violate the rules on serving summonses and
other court papers 53.7
Other 3.1
No corrupt acts take place 7.7
Does not know / No response 16.5
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l imperfect mechanisms of recruitment, career development and
disciplining of court clerks
No objective criteria or adequate procedures exist for the recruitment,
special training and professional qualification of court clerks. In addition,
court administration, which is a body of court clerks, is too much absorbed
by its own problems and established practices. Court clerks tend to behave
unfriendly to customers who are normally perceived as a nuisance.
As long as court clerks do not avail of any special status, they are subject
to the rules of the Labor Code, including those on disciplinary sanctions
and the mechanisms of disciplining. The inefficiency of those provisions
greatly inhibits the disciplining of court clerks. Given that clerks are
normally to be disciplined by the head of the body of the Judiciary where
they work, and he or she is extremely busy, inter alia with a number of
strange tasks, there is clearly no working mechanism that makes it possible
to discipline court clerks. In that situation, those rule of the Code of Ethics
of Court Clerks which provide that disciplinary sanctions should be
imposed for any violation of the Code are not but a dead letter.
l impeded access to the work of the court administration
The practice is established that all contacts with court administrative
services should be in person, by way of visiting the court building. Mailing
is unsafe and entails substantial risks, especially where the papers sent by
post involve compliance with statutory time limits. The working hours of
the different administrations fail to match the needs of the visitors. No
obligation exists to provide information by phone or on the Internet.
l the inefficient work of company registration divisions in courts
These are the most overloaded divisions in district courts and their
inefficient work organization, which is due to the non-automated
processing and use of information, offers a fertile ground for corrupt
practices to flourish. The primitive conditions of keeping and maintaining
company registers, the clumsy system of providing information from those
registers, the lack of any linkage among the different company registration
divisions, etc., obstruct the work of both judges and court clerks, and
also of anyone who has to contact magistrates or court administration.
The reform of court administration is intended to put in place, via the
corresponding legislative and organizational changes, an efficient
mechanism of administration that should improve the work and reduce
to a minimum the possibilities for corruption in this area. That could be
achieved by building up a new, modern structure, organization and
management of court administration based on new principles. For that
purpose, it is necessary to devise an entirely new concept for organizing
the work of court administration and to provide it with the required
legislative framework and technical equipment.
First of all, serious discussions should be held with representatives of the
Judiciary and of court clerks and, due account being taken of the problems
court administration faces at present, the required specific changes in
the operation of court clerks should be identified.
2. The objective of
reforms. The need to
build up a novel,
modern structure and
organization of work
for the administration
of judicial bodies on
the basis
of new principles
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The main aspects and principles of reform could be depicted as follows:
l clear and unified rules whose application should bring in transparent
and uniform practices;
l simplified procedures ensuring the necessary swiftness and integrity
of relationships and curbing the possibilities of citizens, parties to the
cases, other bodies of the Judiciary or other institutions with which
the Judiciary interacts to impact on the outcome of proceedings by
use of corrupt means;
l automating and providing the necessary technical equipment to ensure
work with and the exchange of information, inter alia by introducing a
Unified Case Number Classificator (i.e. affixing a code to each case
that should facilitate the search for and the tracing of any instituted
proceedings);
l exercising administrative supervision and empowering efficient civic
control over the work of court administration.
3.1. Proposed improvements in the legal framework
In order to successfully modernize the operation of court administration
and to fasten it to corruption-free pillars, the following amendments should
be made to the legislative framework:
l the fundamental general principles of the operation of court
administration should be refined, as should be the status of court
clerks. This should happen by improving and elaborating on the
provisions of Chapter Fifteen, Law on the Judiciary;
l on the basis of an agreed and unified conceptual and legislative
framework, all instruments of secondary legislation and the internal
regulations on the work of court administration, prescribed by s.
188 Law on the Judiciary, should be drafted; these should govern in
detail and with precision the structure and the organization of court
administration, the requirements thereto, the recruitment criteria, the
specific rights and duties of court clerks, as well as the aspects of
continuous training and professional improvement;
l requirements should be introduced, in line with the new conceptual
and legislative framework, towards the categories and number of
court clerks in all groups of judicial bodies, and detailed job
descriptions should be prepared for them;
l the importance of ethical rules should be reiterated, and compliance
therewith must be ensured through appropriate controls and sanctions;
l thorough rules should be introduced on access to the information
handled by court clerks (who should be entitled to have access,
parameters of official secrecy, procedures);
l a system of random assignment of cases should be introduced.
Assignment could be based on the sequential number of a case or
3. Proposed reforms
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made in an alphabetical order or follow another pattern established
in advance (even by virtue of internal regulations);
l time standards should be introduced for the management of each
category of cases;
l amendments should be made to the two procedural laws (Code of Civil
Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure) with respect to the serving
of court papers (summonses or others);
Even a more radical change in civil procedure could be contemplated,
namely to require a preliminary exchange of papers between the
parties. This should be coupled with a pre-hearing conference to help
sort out many of the issues relating to the development of the procedure
and to its framework, in law and in fact, so as to speed up and improve
the administration of justice in civil cases (see below for details, Civil Law
and Procedure, 3.4.3). Another idea has also been advanced for a public
debate, namely that structures outside the court might serve court papers
under strictly negotiated contractual terms and conditions (a method that
turned out to be successful in the United Kingdom and in France). The
court would thus be relieved of the enormous technical work currently
incumbent on it, while contractors would be motivated and interested in
performing well and on time.
l the fulfilment of some tasks and their transfer to bodies outside the
courts should be given due consideration, e.g. the incorporation of
legal entities. Should that happen, many judges and court clerks would
be freed from piles of work that is purely technical (see below for
details, Civil Law and Procedure, 3.2).
3.2. Organizational changes needed to further reform in the admin-
istration of judicial bodies
3.2.1. Financial resources, equipment and facilities for administrative work
l It is necessary to provide court administration with sufficient funding,
equipment and facilities, within the budget of the entire Judiciary, in
order to overcome the existing disparities in that respect between the
Judiciary and the other branches of power, on the one hand, and
among the separate branches and bodies inside the Judiciary, on the
other hand. This should be furthered by an equitable allocation of
resources among the branches of the Judiciary, while inter alia striking
a fair balance between Sofia and the countryside, between central
and local bodies.
l To modernize court administration, more funds should be earmarked
in the budget of the Judiciary for the work of that administration in
general, and for case management, in particular.
l The conditions of work should be improved through the optimum
use and management of the Court Houses Fund which should be relied
on to expand and improve the existing buildings of the Judiciary and
the equipment at the work places of court clerks.
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l Competitions should become the standard practice of appointing court
clerks, as envisaged in s. 188a Law on the Judiciary and in the Rules on
the Organization of Court Administration, on the Functions of Services at
Regional, District, Military and Appellate Courts, and on the Status of Court
Clerks.
l A mechanism should be devised for the recruitment of new court
staff trained in specialized schools, while appointed clerks should be
involved in continuous training.
l New mechanisms of management and control of court clerks should
be elaborated.
3.2.2. Changing the work with and the provision of information.
Automating administrative work
To ensure a speedier and more transparent processing and provision of
information, so as to enhance the work of court administration and reduce
to a minimum the chances for corrupt practices, the following measures
should be implemented:
l transferring any case-related information and operations from paper
to electronic medium and storing all cases in electronic form, provided
that all courts use the same software product;
l connecting the information systems of the different courts into a
common network and linking the latter to the information networks
of other institutions to ensure the exchange and use of information,
on the model of the Unified Information System for Combating Crime
that must become operational as soon as possible;
l further to the above steps, introducing new statistical report forms
on the work of courts, and providing those forms to the institutions
concerned, i.e. the Supreme Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice,
etc.;
l introducing a new mechanism to search for and retrieve case-related
information from the files by devoting several work stations solely to
this activity that should be carried out through a software program;
that would enable the other members of court staff to work at ease
and concentrate on the cases themselves and on the orderly processing
of court papers;
l court services should provide, in electronic form, any public
information to outside agencies and institutions, as well as to private
individuals (notaries, law firms, etc.), in return for a fee and under
strict information security arrangements embedded in the software
used.
3.2.3. Changing the structures of and the corresponding positions in the
administration of judicial bodies
In order to upgrade court administration and ensure its smooth operation,
the adoption of legal rules should be speeded up, as should be the
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introduction of some new positions and the review of the functions
associated with certain existing jobs:
l setting up administrative services with certain bodies of the Judiciary
identified by law; those services will have to assist the respective bodies
in their operation;
l introducing the position of court administrators, as required by the
Law on the Judiciary, in the courts and in public prosecution offices.
Those officials should plan, organize and manage court clerks, be in
charge of managing the administrative operations of the court,
implement programmatic decisions relative to long-term planning,
budget policy, finance and automation, and ordering equipment
supplies. For the fulfilment of those duties, court administrators should
be provided inter alia with the right to organize tendering procedures
and to enter into contracts for the upkeep and repair of court houses,
purchase tangible assets for the respective court or prosecution office,
after prior approval by its head official, organize contests and identify
persons suitable to become court clerks, relocate already appointed
clerks to other places, define the specific obligations of every court
clerk at his or her workplace and monitor their performance, make
proposals to discipline clerks, monitor court security arrangements and
good order in the court house, etc.;
l promoting the role of court police who should maintain order and
security in the court houses and assist with court execution and
enforcement, the serving of court papers, the forcible bringing in of
witnesses, etc. These functions are to be fulfilled now by the
specialized security unit envisaged in s. 36e of the Law on the Judiciary
but, due to poor funding, that unit would hardly be able to meet in
the near future the expectations it faces;
l reconsidering the functions of and the requirements towards court
registration clerks, depending on the features of the information
system to be implemented. Those clerks should load and control any
case-related information into the system and facilitate the exchange
of and access to the information sought. Likewise, new types of court
registers and new methods of keeping them should be devised, in line
with the would-be automated system;
l introducing the position of court statisticians who are expected to
improve substantially the quality and accuracy of the information
provided and to free the court secretaries and registration clerks from
functions that are inconsistent with their positions;
l improving the performance of court secretaries in recording and
keeping the records of court hearings by way of software products.
The above steps, if undertaken, should considerably improve the work of
various clerks and of the administration of judicial bodies as a whole,
and would allow the heads of different bodies within the Judiciary to rid
themselves of countless atypical functions they are bound to perform now.
The clear distinction between the responsibilities of different officials
would contribute to a speedier, more transparent and efficient ministration
of justice.
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III. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF MAGISTRATES AND
COURT CLERKS
The training and career development of magistrates should be an
unquestioned priority of judicial reform. Even the most perfect legislation
would be lifeless unless it is enforced by competent and uncorrupted
individuals of impeccable integrity. Laws are binding on each and every
citizen of a state but the bodies of the Judiciary have a key part to play
once the laws are violated. Similarly crucial are the professional
qualification and the integrity of court clerks, as is the responsibility they
have in ensuring a high-quality performance of the whole judicial branch
of power.
1.1. The status quo and the problems
The standards of efficient performance and high professionalism and
integrity dictate not only that judges, prosecutors and investigators have
law degrees: they must also undergo initial training, i.e. one provided
before they have taken office, and on-the-job training, which should take
place on a continuous basis throughout their professional lives.
As regards law degrees, ten law schools at different higher education
institutions across the country now offer law degrees and issue diplomas
whereby the qualification of a lawyer is recognized. A unified state
standard for university law degrees has been introduced which is laid
down in the Ordinance on Unified State Requirements for Obtaining University
Degree in Law and the Professional Qualification of Lawyer (published, SG,
issue 31 of 12 April 1996; amended, SG, issue 96 of 24 November 2000;
issue 59 of 3 July 2001; issue 117 of 17 December 2002, in effect as of 17
December 2002). Although education at all those law schools has been
formally brought into line with unified requirements, its results have not
yet improved materially.
Law students are given training in all branches of law and no specialized
practical training exists. The training of lawyer-apprentices is also far from
being satisfactory. As regards practical training and the future choice of
profession by law graduates, reliance is placed on the compulsory post-
graduate apprenticeship. There is a virtually unanimous opinion, though,
that the apprenticeship is formalistic, inefficient and fails to hit its expected
targets, and even more so after it was substantially shortened some time
ago. Tutor judges are overworked and unable to spare enough time for
the practical training of lawyer-apprentices who are scattered unevenly
across the district (second-tier) courts in the country. Apprentices, in turn,
are not sufficiently interested in their practical training. The test they have
to pass to prove their theoretical background and practical skills and to
qualify to practice as lawyers is equally formalistic and futile. The
amendments to the Law on the Judiciary made in 2002 and furthered by
the amendments of July 2003 reduced the duration of compulsory
apprenticeship from one year to three months and that could hardly better
the knowledge or the skills of future magistrates.
The need to improve the training and to permit regular improvements of
the qualification of magistrates was identified a long time ago and has
been mentioned in a number of documents and papers, including the
Government Strategy for Reform of the Judiciary in Bulgaria. Nonetheless, the
1. Education and
training of
magistrates
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current situation is characterized by the following black spots:
l poor professional knowledge and practical skills;
l insufficient funding earmarked for training in the budgets of both the
Ministry of Justice and the Judiciary;
l magistrates are overloaded, so they have lesser opportunities to engage
in self-education or in organized training events;
l there is no system linking the training undergone with the right to career
development, or the attained degree of qualification with professional
promotion.
1.2. Proposed reforms
With respect to higher education: in order for law students to have the
opportunity to choose a specific profession already at university, it is
required:
l to use adequately all available optional and elective courses, as they
allow for some specialization of education;
l to emphasize the link between theory and practice in the process of
teaching, by involving eminent magistrates; seminars should not merely
replicate the lectures but serve to give practical knowledge and skills
to the students, inter alia, by way of moot court exercises, drafting
warrants, indictments, verdicts, judgments in civil cases, rulings, etc.;
l to make the apprenticeship periods in the course of university studies
more efficient and to improve the link between law schools and the
institutions where apprentices are placed;
l to refine the form and the procedure of the final exam, which is the
last stage of education;
l to develop a working system of post-graduate specialization, open to
practicing magistrates, at the universities.
As regards the practical training of apprentice-lawyers, a change in the
duration of apprenticeship would hardly be successful per se. Two options
are suggested to resolve that problem. In the first scenario, apprenticeship
should be given a completely new basis, especially in relation to future
magistrates. In order to ensure a fully-fledged apprenticeship, it is
advisable to make the following amendments to the legal rules that lay
down the procedure and the conditions for becoming a qualified lawyer:
l the number of apprentice-lawyers at district courts should be limited
and all apprentices should be seconded evenly throughout the country;
l a system should be introduced for paying tutor judges;
l the exam whereby graduates become qualified lawyers should be
revised, while emphasizing on its practical aspects.
The second scenario is to abolish apprenticeship completely but enhance
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6 The amendments to the Law on the Judiciary of 2002 provided that a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) should be set up with
the Ministry of Justice. As those amendments were declared anti-constitutional by the Constitutional Court (see Judgement
of the Constitutional Court No. 13 of 16 December 2002), the law was amended again in July 2003 and now provides that
the future Institute should be set up with the Supreme Judicial Council. In view of those amendments, the Rules of
Organisation and Procedure of the National Institute of Justice are in preparation. Further to the relevant decision passed by
SJC, NIJ shall be developed on the basis of the existing Magistrates Training Center with its attainments, curricula and
training materials, body of lecturers, officials and assets. NIJ shall offer compulsory training courses for all junior judges
and prosecutors immediately after they have been appointed in the Judiciary.
instead the practical orientation of university studies so that graduates
could become qualified to practice any legal profession already when
they obtain their diplomas. It is proposed to introduce at the law schools
additional, practice-based, training for future judges, prosecutors,
investigators, notaries, bailiffs, real estate registration judges, and other
professions, and the exam for obtaining qualification to practice should
form part of the final exams. It is conceivable to introduce additional
selection criteria (scores during the studies, specific exams passed, etc.)
in order to provide for additional specialized training for future magistrates
within the frame of the basic university curriculum. If legislative rules,
criteria and guarantees are introduced to that effect, education obtained
at law schools would be linked with the right of access to the profession
and with the right to career development thereafter.
In order for the Judiciary to be able to fulfil their mandate to promote the
rule of law and to successfully resist corruption, attention should be given
to the need to improve continuously the professional qualification of
judges, prosecutors and investigators working within the Judiciary, as the
very dynamic changes in the legal framework entail myriad problems in
terms of law enforcement and often result in discrepant case-law. It is
necessary to extend the number of individuals who should undergo
compulsory training at the future National Institute of Justice (NIJ)6  by
introducing compulsory training upon every first appointment to the
position of a president and/or vice president of a regional or district
court, regional or district prosecutor or director of a district
investigation service, as well as on every reappointment from a lower to
a higher court and whenever a magistrate changes the subject matter
dealt with.
The following steps should be undertaken for that purpose:
l linking the future appointments of magistrates and their career
development with the results of education and training;
l developing modern forms of continuous training (e.g. distance learning
and other forms based on new information technology); these should
cover inter alia the enforcement of newly-enacted provisions and, in
the immediate future, European Community law;
l providing for an opportunity that specialized public benefit non-profit
entities could also provide continuous training courses in future, with
the approval of the Supreme Judicial Council.
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In any case, account should be taken of the fact, that there is no other
organization successfully engaged in the training of practicing magistrates
yet but the Magistrates Training Center (MTC) which was set up as a non-
profit organization in April 1999. With MTC, training was for the first
time placed on a systematic basis and involved the joint efforts of the
Ministry of Justice, various NGOs (e.g. the Union of Bulgarian Judges and
the Legal Interaction Alliance which were co-founders of MTC, the Union
of Bulgarian Jurists, the Legal Initiative for Training and Development
(PIOR), the Association of Prosecutors, the Association of Court Clerks,
the American Bar Association /Central and Eurasian Law Initiative, etc.)
and some foreign donor entities (the involvement of the United States
Agency for International Development deserves to be singled out) dealing
with the problems of training.
The further development of the curricula prepared by MTC during its
four-year existence and their implementation in the initial and continuous
training of court candidates and magistrates after NIJ starts its operations
should take place on the basis of continuity and stability of the training
offered, thus enabling members of the Judiciary to maintain and upgrade
their professional knowledge.
The curricula currently existing at the Magistrates Training Center extend
to the following areas:
l initial training of all newly-appointed judges immediately after
they take office;
l compulsory training of newly-appointed magistrates during the
first three years of their working experience; this includes courses
in the administration of the relevant court activities, drafting court
acts, keeping contacts with other bodies of the Judiciary and
with institutions related to the Judiciary, professional ethics, etc.;
l continuous training of magistrates at different levels in topical
legal and professional issues, law of the European Union, the
European Convention on Human Rights, language proficiency
and computer skills, etc.
In addition, the following new curricula are being drafted and are to be
implemented soon:
l initial training of all newly-appointed junior prosecutors
immediately after they take office;
l compulsory training of newly-appointed prosecutors;
l training in the event of moving from one instance to another
and from one branch of the Judiciary to another;
l training in administration and planning (for the heads of bodies
in the judicial system);
l training of bailiffs and real estate registration judges.
The future curricula of MTC/NIJ should also mandatorily include training
in the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.
The development of the requirement to undergo professional training,
the provision of legislative rules to that effect and the linking of hierarchical
promotion to the fulfilment of that requirement (e.g. taking into
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consideration the results of the training exercise when evaluating the
professional performance of magistrates) would capacitate magistrates
to enrich continuously their knowledge of the law and to develop a sense
of professional self-confidence, independence and responsibility, so as
to match the rigorous expectations the public has of the system of justice.
That should also contribute to deploying uniform and efficient practices
in the administration of justice.
In more general terms, training should help to uphold in the behavior of
magistrates values and principles such as impartiality, independence,
intolerance to corruption in general and to any of its forms within the
Judiciary.
So far, the activities of the Magistrates Training Center have focused
primarily on the training of judges. The development and implementation
are forthcoming, with the support of the Judicial Strengthening Project of
the USAID, of training programs intended to improve the qualification of
court clerks, in line with s. 188b Law on the Judiciary. Therefore, once the
Rules of Organization and Procedure of the National Institute of Justice are
approved, the following priority measures should be undertaken at
national level to kick off the training of court clerks:
l using the results of the existing survey of training needs with respect
to court administration;
l identifying the target groups (magistrates and court clerks) and
subgroups;
l selection and training of trainers;
l drafting curricula and training materials;
l developing manuals for each position in the court administration;
l including a compulsory course in court administration in the initial
training curriculum of MTC/NIJ (such courses already exist for judges);
l introducing specialized training in professional ethics and conduct.
Besides, on the basis of programs developed and agreed on at national
level, the training of magistrates should be decentralized by court district
and the responsibility for training court clerks in each district should be
entrusted to the corresponding head of judicial body or to a magistrate
appointed thereby.
In the longer run, the improvement of the knowledge and the professional
qualification of those working in court administration and of future
appointees would require that efforts be made to introduce and provide:
l compulsory training upon any init ial  appointment as court
administrator, to be gradually replaced by specialized training as a
requirement to start working in the court administration7;
7 Established European legal systems generally require administrative officials for the judicial system to be trained in advance
at specialized schools or institutes, and courts recruit their clerks from among the graduates of such specialized institutions.
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l continuous training to improve the qualification on a regular basis;
l training in ethics and anti-corruption.
For the general purpose of training magistrates and court clerks, it is
necessary and especially important to provide sufficient funding to the
Judiciary and to the Ministry of Justice for training initiatives. Since 2000,
no funds have been earmarked for that purpose.
While training should be generally intended to advance professional
qualification, special attention should be attached to its components that
are designed to ensure knowledge of and compliance with ethical norms
and rules, including those aimed to ensure corruption-free behavior.
The survey by Vitosha Research referred to earlier has shown that 46.7 per
cent of magistrates believe the adoption of ethics codes would result in
reducing the level of corruption in the Judiciary.
Ethics codes represent a sui generis guidelines for legal professionals and
for court clerks working in a specific branch of the Judiciary and instruct
them how to respond to unforeseen situations or to circumstances barely
addressed by the legislation in force, and how to cope with issues of
conflict in their day-to-day practice or with the grey areas in a rapidly
changing environment. Those codes mainly inspire motivation and make
it possible to discipline the members of the respective profession. The
criteria and the responsibility for failure to abide by the ethics codes are
essentially moral. Strong and reputable professional organizations of
magistrates and of court clerks are therefore needed which should have
sophisticated internal mechanisms to respond adequately and efficiently
to any instance of unethical behavior by their members. This is also a sine
qua non for the enforcement of the new rule in the Law on the Judiciary (s.
168, subs 1(3)) which provides that failure to abide by the moral rules
enshrined in ethics codes shall form a ground to discipline defaulting
magistrates and court clerks.
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PART TWO
REFORM IN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Criminal law, along with criminal procedure and the execution of
penalties, is among the strongest instruments a state has at its disposal to
suppress crime in general and corruption in particular. The major role
attributed to criminal law in combating crime derives from the fact that,
when implementing its criminal justice policy, any state pursues at least
two objectives: to punish the perpetrators of criminal acts, including
corrupt acts, on the one hand, and to deter and rehabilitate the
perpetrators, and educate all other members of society, on the other hand.
The current system of criminal prosecution is in the main slow, unwieldy
and inefficient. The crimes and the penalties provided for in the Criminal
Code fail to mirror adequately what is a growing economic and
conventional criminality in the modern setting of a market economy. The
framework of criminal procedure, as embedded in the existing Code of
Criminal Procedure, fails to provide sufficient mechanisms and guarantees
for the swift and efficient closure of criminal proceedings with effective
criminal judgments which, in turn, opens the door for exerting corrupt
influences.
Over the past years, numerous legislative amendments have been made
in an effort to modernize criminal law and procedure. Some of those
amendments, however, were piecemeal and were often detached from
any clear and consis-
tent philosophy un-
derlying criminal jus-
tice reforms. The ma-
jor concern behind
those amendments
was to modernize do-
mestic legislation and
to bring it into line
with the European re-
quirements to respect
human rights, while
offering a swift and ef-
ficient administration
of justice. Those ob-
jectives, though, have
mostly remained
unattained and this fu-
els the need to go on
with reforms.
Reform in criminal law
and procedure is pre-
conditioned primarily
by the constitutional
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framework set out by
the Constitution of the
Republic of Bulgaria of
1991. A great portion
of the legislative
amendments in the
area of criminal law,
criminal procedure
and the execution of
penalties would de-
pend directly on any
ideas that might be
drafted for future
amendments to the ba-
sic law of the land, es-
pecially to its chapters
on human rights and
on the Judiciary.
1.1. Problems in sub-
stantive criminal law
During the last few
years, substantive
criminal law has seen
fundamental changes
aimed at improving
the prevention and
prosecution of corrup-
tion-related crimes.
Further to a series of
amendments to the
Criminal Code, the sub-
stantive criminal rules
on corruption offences
now seem to be very
close to the relevant
European standards.
Along with the im-
provement of the legal
framework of bribery,
which is the most typi-
cal corruption crime, a
number of other major
Source: Supreme Prosecution Office of Cassation
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RELATED OFFENCES (SS. 282 AND 283 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE), AND BRIBERY
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8 Before the last amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure made in 2003 (SG, issue 50 of 30 May 2003), proceedings for
office-related offences under ss. 282-283 of the Criminal Code, and for bribery under ss. 304-307 of the Criminal Code were
within the competence of regional (first-tier) courts at first instance. After the amendments, the proceedings for those
crimes have come under the jurisdiction of district (second-tier) courts at first instance.
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corrupt practices have been incriminated as well, e.g. trade in influence,
bribes in the private sector, etc. The rules on some offences that are
often found to be directly linked to genuine corruption crimes have been
improved as well, for instance office-related offences, tax-related of-
fences, etc.
In spite of the essential legislative amendments to substantive criminal
law intended to penalize corruption crimes, a significant number of mag-
istrates still believe that the Criminal Code reveals serious gaps and draw-
backs in that respect. 61 per cent of the magistrates interviewed think
that the latest amendments have failed to provide full coverage of all
social relations where corruption might occur, whereas 76.4 per cent are
of the view that legis-
lat ion in this area
needs further im-
provement.
l A pronounced
weakness of the Crimi-
nal Code is the exist-
ence of numerous
provisions, both in its
General Part and in its
Special Part, which
have been overturned
in whole or in part by
the Constitutional
Court as anti-consti-
tutional .  Although
they are not applied, those provisions have neither been explicitly
repealed, nor have they been modified to match the reasoning of the
Constitutional Court.
l A topical issue that has been lingering for some time is the accurate
definition of the concept of public official. This is of the essence in
the context of corruption offences, as public officials form a major
group of perpetrators for that category of crimes. While the latest
amendments to the Criminal Code have extended the concept of public
official in response to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, some
groups of individuals from the private sector still come within the ambit
of the definition.
l The fundamental weaknesses of the General Part of the Criminal Code
relate to the system of penalties. That matter is currently discussed
not only in Bulgaria but in a number of other countries as well, and
recent developments have brought to the fore new forms of impacting
on perpetrators, other than traditional criminal sanctions. An adequate
system of penalties is crucial for the efficiency of criminal justice policy
in any state, and even more so with respect to corruption offences.
It is notorious that Bulgaria is among the countries with most severe
sanctioning systems in Europe and the law-maker mainly relies on the
penalty of imprisonment, a method that fails to yield the much-hoped
personal or general prevention. Foreign domestic laws exhibit a general
trend to limiting the scope of that penalty, while giving priority to
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
ASSESSMENT OF THE LATEST AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IMMEDIATELY
INCRIMINATING VARIOUS TYPES OF CORRUPT PRACTICES
(CRIMINAL CODE, SPECIAL PART):
Yes No Does not know/
No response
The rules cover in full all social relations where
corruption might occur 20.9 61.0 18.1
The penalties envisaged are proportionate to the
incriminated offences 39.2 39.6 21.1
The legislation needs improvement
in that respect 76.4 11.7 11.9
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pecuniary sanctions and to some new forms of engaging the criminal
liability of offenders.
At the same time, the current system of sanctions includes some penalties
that are far too outdated and inefficient. One example is correctional
labor that could be imposed at times, on an alternative or cumulative
basis, for some corruption offences (embezzlement by public officials,
office-related offences, offences against the system of justice, etc.). As it
was coined in a completely different social environment, that penalty is
currently inapplicable for any practical purposes. Almost the same holds
true for public reprimand: it lacks any state-related coercion, so its
efficiency as a sanction is more than doubtful.
With the latest amendments to the Criminal Code (in force as from 1
October 2002), partial efforts were made to improve the system of
penalties for corruption-related offences. With respect to the different
forms of bribery and the new provisions on completely novel crimes, e.g.
trade in influence, criminal fines were introduced and must be imposed
as an alternative to, or on a cumulative basis with, imprisonment. The
law-maker, though, failed to bring that approach to its logical end.
Imprisonment therefore still remains the only possible sanction for many
other offences that are connected in one way or another with corruption.
l Serious drawbacks impair the rules on the criminal liability of juve-
niles. No clear philosophy exists for a government juvenile delinquency
policy that should be implemented through specific sanctions apt for
the age of juvenile offenders. The existing sanctions for juveniles un-
der the Criminal Code rather result from a merely mechanical adjust-
ment of the general system of sanctions to offences committed by ju-
veniles.
l The rules on probation introduced in the Criminal Code are fairly
unsatisfactory and, moreover, their consistency with the Constitution
could be reasonably questioned. Those rules make it possible to treat
defendants unequally and unfairly when that penalty is imposed with
the sentence and when the specific probation measures are
individualized. In other words, under the existing provisions two
persons having received the same sentence can actually be subjected
to restrictions that differ in scope. That would nurture corrupt practices
and risks to entail attempted manipulations of judges when they opt
for probation, especially in the case of lighter sentences against which
no cassation appeal lies.
When the rules on probation were in the process of adoption, a purely
mechanic approach was applied of substituting probation in the Special
Part of the Criminal Code for the penalties of compulsory resettlement or
deprivation of the right to reside in a given village or town. That move
was at odds with the fundamental principles underlying the
individualization of penalties by the court and left open the question of
how penalties other than probation should be applied, especially where
the Criminal Code provides another penalty as an alternative to, or on a
cumulative basis with, probation.
l The system of the Special Part of the Criminal Code is inaccurate
and inconsistent. The numerous recent amendments to the Code re-
flect plenty of compromises in that respect and many offences are in
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clearly unsuitable chapters. This is largely true of bribery which now
falls under the heading of Offences against the Operation of Government
Agencies and Public Organizations. Placing bribery in that chapter of the
Code prevents the prosecution of corruption offences in the private
sector, in public enterprises or even in municipalities. This finding is
only confirmed by the imperfect rule of s. 225c of the Criminal Code
which represents a rather underdeveloped framework of anti-corrup-
tion in the economic sector.
l The major changes in the legal framework of bribery brought about by
the latest amendments to the Criminal Code consisted in introducing
some new forms of actus reus. Their content, though, remains basically
unclear. This could seriously inhibit the development of case-law and
open the door for arbitrariness.
l Bulgarian criminal law still fails to address the issue of corporate crimi-
nal liability. Many corruption offences are committed exactly to the
benefit of legal entities which, nonetheless, cannot be efficiently sanc-
tioned under any piece of existing legislation in Bulgaria.
1.2. Problems in criminal procedure
The existing pitfalls in investigating and prosecuting crime in general, and
corruption in particular, are mainly due to the low efficiency of criminal
procedure which prevents the state from pursuing its criminal-law claim
on time.
In the last years, a series of legislative amendments have been under-
taken in criminal procedure and many of them have divided the legal
community in their opinions. Although some of the amendments to crimi-
nal procedure have been incoherent, the red threads of the reform are
visible and can be said to mirror the established international standards,
the progress made in different legal systems and the experience of prac-
titioners involved with criminal procedure. The major goal of the amend-
ments to the Code of
Criminal Procedure was
to draw the right bal-
ance between the re-
liable guarantees for
human rights and the
efficient administra-
tion of justice. That
goal,  however, re-
mains largely unat-
tained, so reforms
should continue. The
most desirable ap-
proach would be to
draft an entirely new
Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, although the Bul-
garian law-maker has
generally stuck to the
right ideas in the
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION AT VARIOUS STAGES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
%
Preliminary police inquiry (steps undertaken outside the context
of formal criminal proceedings) 15.9
Police investigation 19.6
Preliminary proceedings 15.6
Trial 19.4
Other 1.1
Equally spread at all stages 10.6
No corruption exists in criminal proceedings 4.4
Does not know/No response 13.4
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amendments to criminal procedure throughout the years. A new Code
would help overcome the inevitable difficulties of implementing a fun-
damental reform in a piece of legislation adopted in 1974 and based on a
philosophy other than that underlying the reform itself. Those problems
are illustrated by the existence of contradictory, mutually exclusive pro-
cedural structures, the difficult co-existence in the same law of ideas of
rather different natures, the inaccurate system of the Code, to name but
a few. Hence, a new Code of Criminal Procedure would be the best ap-
proach to reform in criminal procedure. On the other hand, though, that
should not be regarded as an absolute precondition for the success of
reforms. It is indeed more important to enshrine in domestic legislation
the right ideas than to have a new law at any price. The laws of many
European countries, such as Germany, France, Belgium, etc., whose pro-
cedural rules are centuries-old, incorporate the most progressive ideas of
effective criminal justice and offer genuine guarantees for the protection
of human rights.
In May 2003, the National Assembly passed the next-in-a-row Law on
Amending and Supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure with a number
of provisions intended to speed up the development and completion of
criminal cases. The most important of those amendments could be
summarized as follows:
l Further to earlier 2002 amendments to the Criminal Code, the so-called
mixed proceedings (public-private proceedings) were introduced. In
those cases, for some offences under the Criminal Code the criminal
procedure is initiated by the victims lodging a complaint with the
public prosecution, but once the public prosecution decides to
prosecute, the proceedings can no longer be discontinued at the
request of the victim. For other offences, the proceedings are
discontinued if the victim requests so prior to the start of inquiry by
the court of first instance. This approach certainly serves two
fundamental objectives: while the will of the victim is taken into
consideration, the criminal justice system is partially relieved from its
enormous workload.
l The possibility was abolished to bring civil claims at the pre-trial stage
of criminal proceedings.
l The preliminary police inquiry was abolished, so it is no longer a
prerequisite for instituting preliminary criminal proceedings where no
sufficient data exist that an offence was committed. Under the
amendments, when urgent investigation steps have to be made, the
preliminary proceedings shall be deemed instituted as from the date
of the official warrant stating that the respective investigative step has
been undertaken.
The preliminary police inquiry, which was an extra-procedural activity,
had virtually gone away from the initial idea of the law-maker to allow
for an operational, quick check as to whether or not sufficient data exist
to institute formal criminal proceedings. In a number of instances, the
preliminary police inquiry took longer than the formal criminal procedure
itself. In that way inquiries not only became an impediment to the timely
start and closing of criminal proceedings but turned into a tool to discredit
citizens and torment them, or even to exert corrupt pressure.
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l The original rules on plea bargaining were restored by repealing the
improvident earlier amendments made in 2001.
The instrument of plea bargaining was introduced with the amendments
to the Code of Criminal Procedure in force as of the beginning of 2000 and
quickly grew into a flexible procedural method accelerating criminal
prosecution and barring corrupt practices in the relationships between
accused and magistrates. The information about the criminal cases closed
in 2000 shows that 36.6 per cent, or more than one third of the total
number of cases resolved in that year ended by plea bargaining. The
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure made in 2001 narrowed
beyond reasonable limits the possibilities to use that vehicle and actually
made it inapplicable as a means to quickly satisfy the criminal-law claim
of the state towards the offender and to meet the victims demand for
redress. The rules were therefore changed again and the texts repealed
in 2001 were reinstated.
l The right of the accused was introduced to request the court, after the
expiration of a certain statutory time limit from the submission of the
indictment (two years in the case of indictment for a serious offence,
and one year in any other case), to hear his case on the merits.
l The original rules on police investigation were restored by repealing
the pointless amendments made in 2001.
After police investigation was initially introduced, in 2000 nearly five times
more police procedures ended with opinions to refer the matter to court,
compared to the year before, and the time of investigating the offences
was reduced about five times on average. Criticism of the new legislation
was mainly generated by the fact that many of the police officers
empowered to conduct those proceedings lacked the required legal
background which sometimes affected adversely the quality of police
investigation work. The amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure
made in 2001, however failed to address the problems identified but, on
the contrary, reinforced the sort of procedural formalism which seriously
hindered police investigation, while depriving it of its inherent operational
nature, quickness and efficiency.
l The possibility of the judge-rapporteur and of the court of first instance
to discontinue the trial and remit the case to the public prosecutor
for further investigation on grounds of serious procedural violations is
now solely confined to those cases where the violations in question
has resulted in limiting the procedural rights of the accused or of
counsel for the defense.
l The amendments enabled the court to impose a fine of up to 500 Levs
on any party, witness or expert whose failure to appear without good
reason has resulted in adjourning a hearing.
l The possibility was abolished for public prosecutors to bring a new
indictment for the first time before the court of appeal.
l The possibility of public prosecutors was abolished to appeal at
three instances against the order of the court to remit a case to the
pre-trial stage, and the possibility to appeal at three instances
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against the warrants of the public prosecutor to discontinue the
criminal proceedings. That provision, which was introduced with the
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2001, virtually blocked
the criminal procedure and its abolition was a must so that the
development and completion of criminal cases could be accelerated
and, hence, corruption be suppressed.
The most recent amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure display
some shortcomings as well. First of all, the change of jurisdiction for some
categories of cases did not match the competence of the investigative
authorities supposed to deal with those cases. Thus, smuggling cases were
placed within the competence of district (second-tier) courts at first
instance but the power of customs inspectors to investigate such cases
was also retained. An explicit rule of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that all cases falling within the jurisdiction of district courts must
be investigated by investigators through the machinery of preliminary
proceedings. To rectify that inconsistency, a new Law on Amending and
Supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure was passed (SG, issue 57 of
2003). The same law addressed the problems that had arisen in practice
further to the changes in jurisdiction for some cases. Regardless of the
well-known principle that newly-adopted rules of criminal procedure must
apply to all pending cases, the law-maker expressly provided that the
cases pending before the courts should be completed under the previous
procedural rules. Another problematic issue was the impossibility of the
corresponding bodies of MoI (which are not police inspectors) to
undertake urgent procedural steps that could formally launch the
procedure and remain relevant at all subsequent stages of the proceedings.
Nonetheless, it cannot be reasonably argued that the authorities in charge
of combating crime are deprived of the rights to use special investigation
techniques. The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Law on Special
Investigation Techniques invite the opposite conclusion: any possibility exists
to use special investigation means and even a step forward has been made
as demonstrative evidence obtained in compliance with the Law on Special
Investigation Techniques can now be used in criminal procedure.
Pre-trial proceedings are not a problem-free area either, as the public
prosecutor has the power to take the criminal case over from the investi-
gator for an indefinite period. This results in delaying the investigation
and even in futile investigations as some procedural steps are precluded
when a substantial period of time has lapsed. As the public prosecutor is
the master of pre-trial proceedings (dominus litis), he or she can either
give instructions that are binding on the investigative authorities or con-
duct investigative steps himself or take over the investigation case. The
unlawful practice referred to earlier may be rectified through the inter-
ference of a superior prosecutor, and this is actually the idea behind a
strictly hierarchical structure for the prosecution office. The newly-intro-
duced norm of s. 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure which enables
the accused to seek, after the expiration of a certain time as of the bring-
ing of the indictment, that his case be heard in court on the merits, is
another legal ground that might be used, in combination with efficient
disciplinary arrangements, to rectify such illegal practices.
The existing Code of Criminal Procedure is flawed in that the public pros-
ecutor is able to modify the charges at first instance. It is quite right for
the public prosecutor to be the dominus litis at the preliminary, pre-trial
stage where evidence is gathered and the prosecutor should decide on
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Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
WHY ARE CORRUPT ACTS (OFFERING BRIBES, TRAFFIC IN INFLUENCE, ETC.)
UNDERTAKEN VIS-À-VIS THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF OFFICIALS?
Public prosecutors Yes %
To discontinue the criminal proceedings 63.4
To institute / to fail to institute pre-trial proceedings or
preliminary police inquiry 49.3
To bring / to fail to bring an indictment before the court 27.8
To remit the case for further investigation without good reason 23.3
To fail to carry out certain procedural steps where under
an obligation to undertake them 19.8
To exert improper influence 17.0
Other 1.5
No corrupt acts are carried out 4.6
Does not know/No response 12.3
Investigators Yes %
To carry out or to fail to carry out certain procedural steps
relative to investigation 59.5
To suspend the investigation or to
propose its discontinuance 56.2
To exert improper influence 28.0
Other 2.2
No corrupt acts are carried out 6.2
Does not know/No response 13.2
whether or not to
bring an indictment
against the offender
before the court. In
court proceedings,
however, the public
prosecutor is not but a
party placed on an
equal footing with
other parties to the
proceedings. The pos-
sibility for prosecutors
to modify at trial the
indictment they have
brought themselves
places them undeser-
vedly in a privileged
position, provides an
incentive to investi-
gate inattentively and
to refrain from effi-
ciently monitoring the
objectivity, compre-
hensiveness and com-
pleteness of the inves-
tigation and, finally,
results in submitting
i l l- founded indict-
ments to the court. In
addition, the prosecu-
tor is put ex lege above
all other parties to the
proceedings, and this sometimes benefits the exertion of corrupt influ-
ences.
Another major reason for the procrastination of criminal procedure, al-
ready at trial, is the introduction of three regular court instances and
the impossibility to skip any of them. This turns the challenging of court
acts into a sluggish and complex process which prevents the timely entry
into force of criminal judgments, inhibits unduly the progress of cases,
and invites frequent resorts to corrupt pressure.
1.3. Problems in the rules on the execution of penalties
The latest amendments to the Law on the Execution of Penalties enacted in
2002 introduced numerous changes, so as to better the legal framework
of the execution of penalties. The law now covers a number of instruments
and methods previously governed by secondary legislation. Substantial
portions of the law were brought into line with the requirements of
European and international law.
In spite of the recent amendments, the current legal provisions suffer a
number of weaknesses which prevent the efficient execution of sentences
and are often conducive to corruption.
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Firstly, problems exist with the rules on serving the sentence of
imprisonment and these could be summarized as follows:
l Inaccurate rules on the rights and obligations of convicts and of prison
administration. This provides incentives to attempt to corrupt prison
staff at lower levels.
l Deficiencies in the rules on health care services to be provided in
prison facilities which make it possible for the stays at medical rooms
and accommodation at hospitals to be frequently related to the use of
corrupt influences.
l Inefficient monitoring of the work of prison administration.
As regards the arrangements for the execution of penalties other than
imprisonment, particular attention is warranted by the lack of any rules
on the execution of the new penalty of probation, recently introduced
with the amendments to the Criminal Code of 2002. The provisions of the
Criminal Code on probation must enter into force on 1 January 2004 but
the non-existing framework for the execution of that penalty will block
its efficient use, as both the procedure and the conditions for its
enforcement remain obscure.
Reform in criminal law and procedure is aimed at building up a modern
and efficient system for the investigation and prosecution of criminal
offences, including corruption, and introducing efficient legislative
mechanisms that enable the prevention of corruption in the context
of criminal prosecution itself.
A prerequisite for the successful attainment of those objectives is to root
the reform of criminal law and procedure in a conceptually sound
philosophy underlying a new criminal justice policy, and in modern
crime-deterring strategies. That new philosophy should form the basis
to adopt novel Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Law on the
Execution of Penalties which should provide for new legal structures, use
uniform terminology and have coherent systems.
Meanwhile, given the complexity of that process and the lengthy period
of time it needs, reforms could continue even within the framework of
the existing pieces of legislation. It is indeed more important to have a
law with a modern and up-to-date philosophical background, than to
have a brand new law. Good examples here are furnished by the legal
systems of many contemporary countries where legal instruments passed
more than two centuries ago impress as they look completely modern
and adequate. Priority, therefore, should be given to the urgent inclusion
in the Bulgarian legal system of those ideas and structures which reflect
the existing general trends of reform in criminal law, criminal procedure
and penitentiary work world-wide. In that way, reforms will gradually
2. The objective of
reforms in criminal
law and procedure
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take place in the existing legislation, while the new legislative instruments
are in the making.
3.1. Proposed reforms in criminal law
To uproot the existing problems in the field of criminal law, the following
measures should be undertaken:
l Carrying out a thorough review of the case-law of the Constitutional
Court that concerns either the General or the Special Part of the
Criminal Code .  The provisions which have been found anti-
constitutional must either be amended in light of the reasoning offered
by the Constitutional Court or else be repealed, should their fixing
prove impossible.
l Refining the definition of public official in order to adjust the
inconsistencies in its content.
l Extending the scope of the penalty of fine so as to cover a number of
office-related offences driven by self-interest which could, in essence,
represent acts of corruption.
l Reconsidering whether or not the penalty of correctional labor should
remain in the system of sanctions, and devising new content for the
penalty of public reprimand.
l Inserting a completely new system of penalties for juveniles who are
not seldom the perpetrators of corrupt offences. This could be achieved
through the required amendments to the Criminal Code or through a
separate piece of legislation addressing the delinquent acts (criminal
or other offences, misconduct) committed by juveniles. The emphasis
here should be on rehabilitation measures and on the concern to
reform juvenile offenders, while the idea of punishment should move
to the background.
l The concept of probation should be refined in terms of both theory
and legislation. It should be clarified if probation is to be regarded
solely as a penalty and what content it should have exactly, or should
it rather be extended and also become applicable to individuals
released earlier or to parolees or to those conditionally sentenced, or
even be used as a measure for non-absconding.
l A completely new structure for the Special Part of the Criminal Code
should be developed. That part should bring to the fore the priorities
of criminal-law protection and the system of its chapters should be
structured by object of assault.
l Bribery in Bulgarian criminal law should be given a better location.
The inclusion of bribery in a separate chapter of the Criminal Code would
make it possible to provide extensive rules on that offence which could
be applied to the fullest extent, regardless of whether or not the offences
have been committed within state bodies and public organizations. In
parallel to defining the systematic location of the rules on bribery, the
title of the division (or chapter, if there is a separate one on bribery)
3. Proposed reforms
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where those rules will be inserted should be revised, as those provisions
should cover not only bribery but also trade in influence.
l Improving further the legal framework of bribery by clarifying the
elements of the new forms of actus reus, i.e. requesting a gift,
accepting an offer of a gift, accepting a promise of a gift.
Although these forms of actus reus have been taken over from the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, they are not entirely novel in
Bulgaria and most of them existed already at the time of the first
Bulgarian Criminal Law, back in 1896.
l Introducing a clear and accurate definition of the concept of
benefit so as to avoid any suspicion that criminal repression is
extended unreasonably. The new understanding of the object of bribery
also necessitates that s. 307a of the Criminal Code be reworded, while
specifying that any object of bribery shall be forfeited where it
constitutes a tangible benefit.
l Adding police inspectors to the group of officials who are deemed
to occupy responsible positions, so as to regulate their criminal
liability accordingly.
l Updating the rules on some other offences (e.g. document-related
crimes) which often times are connected with or conceal the
commission of genuine corruption offences.
l Providing statutory rules on corporate criminal liability.
To resolve that matter, one of two paths might be followed. Firstly, due
to the notable specificity of corporate liability which differs a lot from the
criminal liability incurred by individuals, instead of amending the Criminal
Code to introduce corporate criminal liability it might be better to draft a
separate law on corporate liability that would enable the easy forfeiture
of benefits derived from or received through criminal activity. That
approach might be especially fruitful in suppressing the financing of
terrorism and would have a substantial preventative effect with respect
to tax- or securities-related offences, etc. The second option is to envisage,
within the Criminal Code itself, specific administrative liability for legal
entities, while defining in parallel those individuals who would incur
criminal liability for the unlawful activities in which a legal person is
involved.
l While the existing legal rules on corruption crimes in the Criminal Code
largely match modern standards, there is no decisive will yet to apply
the new criminal legislation and to improve the capacity of courts and
law enforcement to suppress corruption. Some possible measures along
these lines might be to timely introduce training programs for police
officers and magistrates, and to align the interpretation the courts give
when enforcing the new legislation with the explanatory reports
attached to the relevant international instruments.
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3.2. Proposed reforms in criminal procedure
Reform in criminal procedure should be governed by several principles:
promoting trial as the central stage of criminal procedure; accelerating
the development and completion of proceedings in criminal cases; respect
for the mandatory international standards that ensure the efficient
administration of justice, while providing reliable guarantees for the rights
of citizens.
To attain the objectives of reform in criminal procedure, the following
measures should be taken:
l Accelerating criminal proceedings by extending the number of cases
where no pre-trial proceedings take place but the procedure is
initiated and develops under the rules on criminal cases prosecuted
on complaint by the victim.
l Regulating preliminary proceedings (which are one form of pre-trial
proceedings) on the model of police investigation, while keeping the
procedural formalities only to the extent necessary to guarantee the
rights of the individuals concerned and the reliability of evidence.
l Introducing additional measures to ensure the quick development
of investigation by re-
ducing to a minimum
the number of pre-trial
procedures lasting for
years.
Some of the possible
measures to speed up
investigation would be
to introduce deadlines
the expiry of which
would bar the submis-
sion of the case to
court (a solution that is
found in a number of
foreign domestic legal
systems) or to shorten
the duration of coer-
cive measures. The
law-maker has already
made an important
step on the right track
with the new section
239a of the Code of
Criminal  Procedure
which entitles the ac-
cused to seek that his
case be heard in court on the merits.
l Improving the rules on the other form of pre-trial proceedings, viz.
police investigation.
NUMBER OF INVESTIGATION FILES FOR OFFICE-RELATED OFFENCES (SS. 282-285 OF
THE CRIMINAL CODE), GENERAL ECONOMIC CRIME (SS. 219-227 OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE), AND BRIBERY (S. 301-307A OF THE CRIMINAL CODE): YEAR 2002
Source: National Investigation Service
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As to police investiga-
tion, it is compelling to
limit the opportunities
of public prosecutors
to transform police in-
vestigation into pre-
liminary proceedings.
As a matter of prac-
tice, this is sometimes
a disguised means to
procrastinate the pre-
trial  procedure be-
yond any reasonable
limit. Such practice
fails to benefit the vic-
tim or the accused,
does not contribute to
finding out the real
facts or achieving the
objectives of criminal
procedure, and finally
invites attempts to ex-
ert corrupt influences.
Amendments are also
needed to the rules on
trial. Bulgaria com-
plied with the require-
ments of the European
Convention fot the Pro-
tection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Free-
doms as regards fair
trial a long time ago.
Reforms are therefore
needed at this stage
primarily to ensure the
quick development of
trials, along the follow-
ing lines:
l Keeping at a mini-
mum the instances
where the court remits
the case to the pros-
ecutor. This should help
speed up the proceed-
ings and their comple-
tion, and to reign in cor-
ruption.
l Changing the
rules on summoning so as to relieve the court from the duty to sum-
mon and provide for an obligation on each party to ensure the ap-
pearance of its own witnesses. Such a change would promote the
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adversarial nature of trials and the equality of arms.
l Introducing stricter requirements to parties to invoke their evidence
on time provided that after a certain statutory deadline each party
should have to submit good reason for any request to invoke new
evidence. The procedural discipline of parties is certainly crucial for
accelerating the proceedings but it should not be brought to
unacceptable extremes that prevent the establishment of the real facts
and are at odds with the inherent peculiarities of the process of proving
a case.
l Revisiting the current possibility of prosecutors to modify the
charges at trial. Should that power of prosecutors be limited, the
quality of preliminary proceedings would improve and it would be
much easier for the court to hear the case.
l Improving the legal rules on appeals so as to accelerate criminal
proceedings.
Several possibilities exist to amend the rules on appeals under the Code
of Criminal Procedure. On the one hand, parties may be provided with an
option to skip some appeal instances and directly lodge a cassation
appeal. For example, where the parties have no disagreement as to the
facts and after the time limit to refer the matter to the court of appeal has
lapsed, they could lodge a cassation appeal provided that the problem at
hand relates to an alleged erroneous application of the law. Another option
would be for criminal judgments delivered by a court with jurors to be
subject solely to cassation appeal but not to appeal before lower
instances (i.e. district courts and/or courts of appeal would be skipped).
A third option is also there, namely to provide that cassation appeals
shall constitute an exceptional remedy, rather than a regular means of
review. In other words, after the expiration of the time limit to lodge
appeals with the competent higher court, or after that court delivers
judgment, the act of the first instance would still be subject to cassation
appeal but shall meanwhile enter into force and be executed, unless the
court orders otherwise.
l Introducing various types of differentiated procedures. Such
procedures are widely used in Europe and in the US and enhance the
efficient administration of justice in criminal cases. In most of those
jurisdictions traditional (general) criminal procedure would be an
exception, rather than the rule. By putting in place new, alternative
methods and paths for deciding a matter on the merits many cases
would be diverted from the traditional proceedings. That path for
reform has been recommended by the Council of Europe9  and by the
United Nations, and this has proven to be an efficient legislative
approach to accelerating the procedure in almost all domestic legal
systems.
The differentiated forms that might be implemented in Bulgaria are e.g.
transaction, criminal warrant, victim-offender mediation organized by the
prosecutor, and numerous other schemes known as efficient and useful
9 See e.g. Resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Nos. R (84) 5, R (86) 12, R (87) 18, etc.
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tools in most of the modern legal systems. Those new rules should certainly
be taken over very carefully, while strictly respecting Bulgarian national
traditions, the national mentality and perception of legal regulation and
the prevailing socio-economic relations in the country.
l Rethinking the principle of legality at the point of bringing the
indictment to court. A possibility here is to provide for discretionary
powers of prosecutors to make a case-by-case evaluation of whether
bringing the indictment to court would serve the state or the public
interest. For example, where the offence is petty, the offender pleads
guilty and is prepared to remedy the damage, a public prosecutor
should be able, with the victims consent, to decide whether to proceed
to trial at all.
l Introducing the so-called pre-trial hearings which are known to the
common law system and to a number of European countries (e.g. Italy).
That instruments enables the accused to request the court10  to assess
the well-foundedness of the charges and, hence, spares the trial in
cases where the indictment is not really supported by the evidence on
the file.
3.3. Proposed reforms in the execution of penalties
Reforms in the execution of penalties should continue along the following
main lines:
l Refining the rules that lay down the procedure and the conditions
for relocating accused individuals detained on remand from
investigation arrest places to prison facilities.
The conditions in investigation arrest places, which anyway form part of
the penitentiary system, are much worse than those in prisons. Therefore,
accused and defendants often times strive to be transferred from detention
places to prisons which, in turn facilitates the attempts to exert corrupt
influences. An efficient measure to suppress corruption in that respect
would be to provide detailed rules on when such transfers would be
admissible and on the possible duration of a transfer. Along with the
legislative changes, however, specific measures must be taken to improve
the conditions in investigation arrest places and to bring them closer to
those in prisons.
l Putting in place detailed legal rules on the rights and obligations
of convicts, of individuals detained on remand and of supervising
and security officers at the penitentiary facilities.
l Improving the system of control over those steps of the
administration that might affect the rights of sentenced persons. An
important requirement here is to enhance public control on the
operation of penitentiaries, e.g. by creating a system of checks and
inspections in prisons and correctional houses while involving the
NGOs concerned.
10 In the United States this is the trial judge, as it is not that judge but the jury who decide on guilt, whereas in Italy, for
example, this is the investigative judge as he is not involved in hearing and disposing of the merits.
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l Improving the system of medical service in penitentiary facilities
in order to reduce the cases of convicts being accommodated in
hospitals outside the penitentiary system. Accommodation elsewhere
should only be possible in serious cases where no treatment can be
offered in prison.
l Urgently adopting rules on the execution of the penalty of probation.
Once those rules are drafted, a careful thought should be given to the
possible setting up of probation hostels within the penitentiary system,
on the model of open prison hostels.
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PART THREE
REFORM IN CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE
While the development of civil legislation does not always bear directly
on corruption, it can provide conditions that are either favorable or hostile
to the forms of corruption. The past thirteen years have seen fundamental
changes in Bulgarian civil law in response to the need for new rules on
civil relationships, given the transition from a planned to a market
economy and the introduction of European standards in this area. The
numerous legislative amendments, however, have not always been well-
thought-over and consistent with each other and have entailed
contradictory enforcement and, finally, inadequate rules and protection
of the rights of the subjects of civil law. In addition, half-way, superficial
and often unsuccessful reforms have failed to prevent corruption in the
administration of justice in civil cases, whereas the enforcement of already
adopted legislation has not revealed any tangible corruption-deterring
potential. This virtually undermines the very idea of the rule of law or
even the elements of statehood.
One of the explanations for that inconsistency and for the failure of man
attempted reforms is that the changes are often drafted by experts lacking
the required multi-faceted knowledge who are politically allied or
connected with the interests of various economic groups. In addition,
there has been a growing practice for judges to draft the reforms of their
own activities, of prosecutors and investigators to do the same about their
own work, for attorneys to be required to develop the rules on their
operations, etc. In this situation, some inertia inevitably comes to surface
and the majority of judges prefer the status quo in quite a good faith as
they are tired of reforms. On the other hand, the stand of an insider is
rarely sufficient to pinpoint the defects of any system. At the same time,
if an attempt is made to overcome corrupt phenomena and practices,
those benefiting from the status quo would be the ones to offer the most
serious resistance.
The indiscriminate reliance on advice by foreign experts, and the
automatic copying of legal rules existing elsewhere have not proven to
be any more successful. This is also valid for the formalistic and mechanical
transposition of provisions from the EU directives.
The disturbing findings about the situation with civil law and procedure
(including the enforcement of judgments and the provision of collateral)
generate the need for a swift and radical anti-corruption reform in
respect of civil procedure and for a further systematic, coherent and
consistent development of substantive civil law. To outline the parameters
of that development and the specific reforms to be proposed, it is
compelling to identify the existing problems and to carry out a serious
and in-depth analysis of any factors that impede the problem-free
development of a modern civil turnover in the setting of a free market
economy and under the rule of law.
1. General
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1.1. Problems in substantive civil law
Substantive civil law is aimed at providing comprehensive regulation of
an extremely important sphere of social relations. Not only is it applied
by judicial bodies, but it is also binding on all subjects of law. As long as
the disputes resulting from alleged transgressions of the laws are resolved
by the court, the shortcomings and inconsistencies in substantive law affect
adversely the quality of the administration of justice and, hence, public
trust in the Judiciary. The problems in substantive civil law are therefore
interwoven with those in civil procedure and these two sets of problems
should indeed be addressed jointly.
1.1.1. In the field of property law, the main spots of corrupt pressures
could be said to exist in the following areas:
l notarial law
The imperfect rules on the operation of private notaries seriously
undermine the notarial form of authentication and often pave the way to
corruption or serve as an incentive to crime in civil relationships or in the
course of court proceedings.
l the system of registration of real estate transactions
The existing system fails to provide for genuine guarantees and certainty
in the case of real estate transactions. Real estate registers are currently
kept and entries are made in the 100 regional courts scattered across the
country, and in paper form. This generates enormous problems as far as
the reliability of the information and legal certainty are concerned. For
objective reasons, the process of changes (building up a national electronic
cadastre and developing that cadastre into a nation-wide data base)
launched with the enactment of the Law on the Cadastre and on the Real
Estate Registry (in force since January 1, 2001) is lengthy and expensive,
and would hardly be finalized soon. At the same time, that process has
not been linked yet to the required changes in the system of registries in
general, or in the system of company registration, in particular.
1.1.2. In the field of commercial law as well, there are statutory
preconditions for actions that might, directly or indirectly, entail
corruption:
l company law
Despite the attained high level of harmonization of Bulgarian company
law with EC company law, no satisfactory degree of certainty has been
achieved yet in the commercial and economic turnover, nor has it been
put on a transparent and corruption-free basis. Such an objective has
been pursued with the last amendments to the Commercial Law of June
2003 (published, SG, issue 58 of 2003) and in particular the detailed
regulation of companies transformation and conflict of interest
prevention. In addition, while amendments have been initiated to protect
minority shareholders, the excessive aspiration to uphold their rights
sometimes yields the opposite effect - there have been cases of abuse
against majority shareholders, and this serves as a vehicle to impede the
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day-to-day operation of companies.
l the legal framework of corporate insolvency
Previous amendments to the rules on corporate insolvency have not
resulted in any material acceleration of insolvency proceedings. The
potential therefore persists for attempts to obtain appropriate
judgments more quickly by resort to corrupt methods. References to
the rules on execution laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure also
contributed to complicating and delaying the proceedings. The number
of cases instituted in previous years and the number of newly-opened
insolvency proceedings remain excessive. The last amendments to the
Commercial Law aim at to overcome most of these shortcomings, however
it is too early for the results of their implementation to be predicted.
l the system of company incorporation
The status of company incorporation forms part of the problem with the
status of registration in general. The inefficient system of court registration
in Bulgaria11  is among the factors that predetermine the high level of
corruption in court. The existing registers in Bulgaria are primarily
decentralized and the courts keep them in paper form. Some courts have
experimented with automated information systems but electronic records
have no legal effect as yet. As the volume of information in the registers is
growing, the data become ever less accessible and handling those data
becomes slower and slower, or even impossible. This, in turn, contributes
to a strong corruption pressure both when certain entries are made in
the registers and when information from the registers is to be obtained.
Given the non-contentious nature of incorporation procedure that
develop before the company divisions of district courts, the judges are
deprived of any genuine opportunity to control the lawfulness of the
resolutions that are passed by a legal entity and are subject to registration,
e.g. those for changing the members of company governing bodies. Work
organization in company divisions is not based on unified standards that
might ensure the speediness and reliability of the registrations and entries
made, so these factors become dependent on non-magistrates (e.g. court
clerks). The obsolete, or even antediluvian, manner of keeping the registers
and browsing them for information, and the extremely complex procedure
of modifying or rectifying the information in them form a powerful weapon
to take over the control of companies to the detriment of minority
shareholders. People involved in registration proceedings believe that a
number of courts have unwritten rates for every service that is provided.
Not only does that situation inhibit the normal development of business
and turnover, it also fuels the resistant public perception of corruption
in the judicial system.
1.1.3. In the field of labor law:
Irrespective of the positive developments in the legal framework of
employment relationships designed to bring those in conformity with
modern economic conditions, labor cases are still the largest share of all
11 This is true both of the registration of legal entities in general, including those with non-for-profit objectives, and for the
real estate register.
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court cases in Bulgaria, while substantial unemployment persists. A
number of essential issues are still on the agenda, namely to provide better
guarantees for and protect the right to work as proclaimed by the
Constitution, and to define the effects of the unlawful settlement of labor
disputes. Employment relationships and labor disputes also mirror the
problems which exist in other sets of connected legal relationships, such
as administrative, civil service, social security, pension, social assistance
and unemployment benefit relations, etc. which could transfer elements
to corruption to labor cases.
1.1.4. Contemplated reforms in the field of family law have not taken
place yet, regardless of the ongoing debate. The inadequate rules
on adoption nurture myriad corrupt practices, sometimes with
international involvement.
1.1.5. As regards consumer protection, consumers whose interests have
been harmed are not yet able to defend their rights collectively
(i.e. no class actions are possible).
Last but no least, account should be taken of the fact that in most cases
corrupt practices linked to substantive civil law are due not to the
imperfections of the legal framework per se but to the corrupt attitudes of
the entire society, to defective civil procedure, to the flawed administrative
law, to the lack of liability for public officials and to inefficiency of criminal
legislation.
1.1.6. As regards civil liability for criminal offences, including corrup-
tion-related crimes, the Draft Law on Forfeiture by the State of Prop-
erty Acquired through Criminal Activity (prepared by MoI) has kindled
vivid discussions. Particularly debatable are the proposals to intro-
duce a supplemen-
tary pecuniary sanc-
tion (parallel to and
independent of any
criminal liability), as
well as summary pro-
cedures, referred to as
special procedures
for freezing and sei-
zure with a view to
forfeiture. While the
draft law provides for
a machinery for the
quick freezing and for-
feiture of assets de-
rived from criminal ac-
tivity (and this could
enhance the combat
against crime), it fails
to provide any guarantees against the unlawful application of its
measures so as to serve improper economic or political interests.
The intended benefits of the future law could thus produce nega-
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
OPINION ON THE POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION OF FORFEITURE BY THE STATE
(INCLUDING FREEZING AND SEIZURE) OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED TROUGH
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Yes No Does not know/
No response
It would be a tool to quickly forfeit and freeze assets
derived from criminal activity, thus contributing to
a more efficient suppression
of corruption 70.0 18.3 11.7
A good idea but no sufficient guarantees against
possible abuse 75.8 11.9 12.3
It would not contribute to deterring corruption 19.8 61.0 19.2
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tive effects in that the law could support corruption instead of pre-
venting or penalizing it.
The polls conducted during the debates on the draft to identify the public
opinions about the importance and the expected results of the draft have
revealed a high level of approval and support of the measures proposed.
This could be attributed to the awareness of the need to resist growing
crime by resort to more stringent and quicker measures. At the same
time, despite the large-scale approval of the draft and its expected positive
effect as an efficient deterrent of corruption, many respondents have
voiced concerns about possible abuse.
1.2. Problems in civil procedure
Unlike substantive civil law where the separate institutes exist relatively
autonomously and the drawbacks of existing rules that entice into corrupt
practices could be rectified relatively independently, this is impossible
for civil procedure as, on the whole, it is of crucial importance to the
combat against corruption in all its forms. This is so as, on the one hand,
civil procedure is both a general technique of protecting substantive legal
relationships and a key tool to resist corrupt phenomena.
On the other hand, civil procedure in its nature is a means to protect
substantive civil rights and legal relationships in an environment of
adversarial litigation and clashing interests of disputants where the
resolution of a legal dispute depends on the pronouncement made by
the competent authority (which consists in steps undertaken by natural
persons forming the personal substratum of the authority in question).
Therefore, civil procedure itself is a focal point where corrupt practices
become easily visible.
The previous endeavors for reforms could be given a two-fold description:
1.2.1. In the first place, the law-maker has failed to even attempt to
identify and incorporate in the legal framework the modern trends
in the law of civil procedure. Instead, the Legislature undertook,
yet in a rather straightforward manner, to reproduce old rules
created and used in the past and not quite fit for the contemporary
conditions. Moreover, those rules were not particularly familiar to
that generation of Bulgarian lawyers who were supposed to apply
them. The implementation of the reform naturally highlighted a
number of flaws in the rules. The approach widely used to remedy
those was rather cosmetic in that the amendments designed to
improve the rules not only failed to hit their target but in a number
of occasions evoked other serious problems.
1.2.2. Secondly, those amendments were not provided with a sound
material and financial basis and most of them turned out to be
populist moves. Therefore, they only deepened the divide
between the public and the Judiciary.
The numerous incompetent attempts to improve the rules of civil
procedure have resulted in a situation which often amounts, for all
practical purposes, to a denial of justice.
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Besides, some other key factors have also contributed to the failures in
civil procedure, such as:
l The inefficient or totally lacking criminal repression. This is the core
reason for all sorts of abuse when adversarial proceedings, collateral
proceedings or enforcement are in progress.
l The lack of working mechanisms for attaching disciplinary,
administrative or civil liability to unlawful or improper behavior. The
rules on liability (in all its forms) give the impression that everything
is allowed - or at least goes unpunished. A sustainable public disrespect
for justice is thus perceived. This is a negative factor of a particular
weight in itself. Those moods have recently been reinforced by the
overall discontent with the work of the courts and by the day-to-day
encounters of ordinary citizens with the impunity of individuals whose
unlawful behavior (in the widest sense of this term) deserves the strictest
possible sanctions but who tread the public domain as successful
people, in contrast to those who have failed because they have
been law-abiding and respectful of the legal order.
All those factors generate legal nihilism and a total disrespect for law
which could finally prevent the functioning of the state on the basis of
the rule of law.
Some other specific problems of civil procedure deserve a special mention
as well:
l The introduction of three-instance procedure has resulted mostly in
a lavish civil procedure where the functions of the first and the second
instance largely overlap; procedural discipline is poor as evidence can
be submitted even when the case is reheard by the instance of
cassation. There are no good reasons why all cases should be handled
by all the three instances. It is especially unacceptable for the facts of
a case to be established by two instances in a row which, moreover,
have similar powers in that respect.
l Irregular summoning and the infinite dodges the parties are used to
employ represent key factors for the lengthy proceedings in any
individual case.
All previous changes have modestly attempted to place the burden of
obtaining information about the procedural developments on the party
itself. Nonetheless, there are still opportunities now (after several
amendments along these lines since 1997) to delay the proceedings by
interrupting the order of summoning, and also because of the need to
serve notice that the written judgment is ready (after the end of the
procedure before first and second instance).
l Substantial amendments to enforcement procedure: an area which
is susceptible to corruption has remained almost unreformed over the
past 13 years. The latest amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure (in
force as from 11 November 2002) were geared towards improving and
accelerating the proceedings. At the same time, one could be skeptical
about the expected suppression of corruption as there are still statutory
possibilities to procrastinate cases, inter alia by use of corrupt means.
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l The exist ing
framework of enforce-
ment and collateral
procedures  reveals
another shortcoming
which is essential in
terms of deterring cor-
ruption. In most cases
collateral and enforce-
ment (which largely
predetermine the eco-
nomic contents and
the efficiency of the
legal protection) are
decided on by a dis-
trict (usu. second-in-
stance) court and the
disputed facts can
never be invoked
again before the Su-
preme Court of Cassation. This entails all sorts of inventions, let alone
the fact that corrupt practices develop much easier at local level (for
example, there could be an award by a reputable international arbi-
tration court in favor of a party and the three-instance proceedings for
recognition and enforcement of the award in Bulgaria could have been
finalized successfully; later, the same party might fail to obtain collat-
eral or to enforce the award and such cases could only be reviewed
by district courts).
According to the results of the survey, one out of four magistrates is of
the view that corruption is most widespread in adversarial litigation. It is
noteworthy that this opinion is mainly shared by public prosecutors and
investigators, whereas judges mostly believe corruption exists in non-con-
tentious litigation (including registration proceedings) and enforcement.
The reforms are intended to propose measures whereby all factors
whose manifestation hinder, in one way or another, the modern and
efficient administration of justice in civil cases should come under attack.
The result should be court orders and judgments of high quality, lawful
and fair. In the long run, reforms in civil law and procedure should bring
about a serious change in the current paradigm of all social relations which
can be depicted as a superficial and formalistic perception of law and
failure to respect the government institutions, coupled with high levels of
crime and corruption even among those vested with the exercise of public
functions, and all this to the detriment of the helpless ordinary citizen.
Apparently, there is a compelling need for a comprehensive and in-depth
reconsideration of the overall design of the rules on civil law and
procedure in all their aspects. Along these lines, it is very important, though
insufficient, to draft a good model of a civil procedure law.
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN DIFFERENT SEGMENTS
OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
%
Adversarial litigation 20.0
Collateral proceedings 5.9
Enforcement proceedings 14.8
Non-contentious litigation (including registration proceedings) 13.9
Other (please specify) 0.9
Equally spread in all segments 12.1
No corruption exists in civil proceedings 5.3
Does not know/No response 27.1
2. The objective of
reforms in civil law
and procedure
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
JUDICIAL ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM66
3.1. Amendments to commercial law
The half-way solutions and the inefficient amendments made so far have
imposed the need for a fundamental and substantial reworking of
insolvency procedure, as these are now endlessly inefficient and
formalistic, and form a major source of corruption. The Amendments to
the Commercial Code passed in June of this year contain some provisions
to accelerate insolvency proceedings and to improve corporate
governance (better legal guarantees for the participation of shareholders
in the General Meeting, improved corporate management and supervision
rules, and avoidance of conflict of interests). These should reduce the
chances for corruption and enhance transparency.
Changes in this sphere are a must for the development of commercial
and economic operations in the country on a non-corrupt basis. Those
changes, however, should be carefully thought over and discussed with
all stakeholders. That would help establish a statutory framework matching
the everyday needs and avoid the turbulence of frequent amendments
that generate instability and uncertainty.
3.2. Registration reform
To meet the needs of modern turnover, the registration system should be
centralized, kept in an electronic form and enable the making of entries
and the provision of information by way of electronic real-time
telecommunication. The persons concerned could thus notify any third
party of newly-occurred circumstances and facts within the matter of
hours, by way of electronic registration. Third parties, in turn, would be
able to check the status at the register virtually at the time when
transactions occur. The possibilities for any illegal moves in relation to
registration and to the receipt of information would thus be reduced to
a minimum.
A good possibility to modernize the registration system and to reduce its
corruption potential would be to replace the current manual registration
in court with registration at a Central Register of Legal Entities. This should
be a public institution (a state agency) attached to a central authority (the
Ministry of Justice or the Ministry of Economy, etc.).
The existence of such a Central Register would form the basis for building
up an Electronic Registries Center.
The Central Register of Legal Entities could compile the registration
data for all legal persons governed by private law and for all state-owned
enterprises (political parties and trade unions will be excluded). The legal
entities register could be merged with the Central Pledges Register. Such
a single register would contain all the information on the persons and on
any collateral provided by them, thus avoiding the useless duplication of
information in the commercial register, and in the pledges register and
the ensuing risks of mistakes and inconsistencies. In the longer run, we
could think of merging the legal entities register and the real estate register
so as to produce an Electronic Registries Center. Of course, this could
only be done after the national electronic cadastre has been finalized
and incorporated in the single national data-base. In parallel, the
registration reform should gradually boost the merger of or linking to other
existing or newly-set registers (tax registers, motor vehicle registers, etc.).
3. Proposed reforms
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The move to a Central
Register of Legal En-
tities and to an Elec-
tronic Registries Cen-
ter, coupled with the
projected inclusion of
the real estate register
in that system, would
act as a strong deter-
rent to corruption and
would narrow down
substantially the possi-
bilities for any unlaw-
ful practices in the op-
eration of the registers.
3.3. Amendments to labor law
The objective is to introduce an adequate statutory framework to
counter the discriminatory practices of employers, as these essentially
come down to a violation of the right to work as proclaimed by the
Constitution.
l a national program (strategy) should be drafted for the abolition and
prevention of discrimination with respect to employment and the
professions;
l a legal definition should be provided of direct discrimination which
should cover inter al ia  harassment at work (including sexual
harassment);
l work of comparable value should be provided for and regulated;
l a list of supplementary payments should be drawn up in order to
uphold the equal pay principle (s. 243 of the Labor Code);
l the employer (defendant) should assume the burden of proof in cases
where allegations are made of discriminatory practices at the
workplace;
PROPOSAL FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC REGISTRIES CENTER
Electronic Registries Center
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of Legal
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l the idea is discussed to set up labor courts to meet the need for
specialized, quick and competent administration of justice in labor
disputes.
In the field of labor law, attention should be given to the practices of
indirect (hidden) discrimination in the exercise of employment rights
and obligations. The making or termination of contracts of employment
partially depends on personal and political relationships and connections.
Sometimes privileges or restrictions can be found which are based on
nationality, origin, sex, race, color, age, political or religious belief,
memberships of particular trade unions or other public organizations or
movements, family, social or property status, or disability. These issues
have not been debated yet but bear directly on the development of corrupt
processes and on the possibility to prevent such processes right at the
outset or as substantive legal relationships develop. They also affect the
way in which cases are heard and resolved. Last but not least, this topic is
particularly important and relevant in the context of aligning Bulgarian
legislation with EC law, and needs to be specifically addressed.
3.4. Proposed reforms in civil procedure
3.4.1. The number of instances and other general issues of civil procedure
The entire paradigm of the existing three instances civil procedure should
be revisited:
l It is recommended to introduce regular two-instance procedure, with
a possibility for an extraordinary review by the Supreme Court of
Cassation of all aspects of the substantive and procedural rules involved
in a case, while carefully developing the criteria for allowing such
reviews. The procedure under s. 231 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure
should be kept.
It is unacceptable to preserve the proceedings before the second instance
in their current form. The view that prevails in practice is that the appellate
instance is another first instance. Regretfully enough, that view is no
more than a primitive textbook cliche (and regretfully, again, it is that
view that underlies Interpretative Decision No. 1/99 of the Supreme Court
of Cassation). Modern requirements would be matched far better if the
appellate court just had the power to review the judgment and reverse it
(this was in fact the second-instance procedure before the start of the
reform). In addition, the admission of new evidence should only be
confined to newly-occurred circumstances or to the disclosure of existing
facts or evidence that could not have been known to (or established by)
the parties despite their best care and good faith. The remittance of cases
to the lower instance should only be reserved for judgments that are void
and inadmissible (provided that it is still the court that has to pronounce)
and to the most flagrant procedural violations.
The judgments should become final after the pronouncement of the
second instance.
Rulings (i.e. court acts other than final judgments on the merits) which
are explicitly subject to appeal by virtue of the law should be reviewed
by the Supreme Court of Cassation.
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l It is of the essence to define the powers of the separate instances
and to avoid the unnecessary redundancy in their work12. The powers
of the Supreme Court of Cassation should be regulated in such a way
that the supreme instance could no longer be used as a regular instance
in almost all cases. At the same time, a genuine possibility should be
preserved for the Supreme Court of Cassation to perform its
constitutional function to ensure the accurate and uniform application
of the laws by all courts. It could also be provided that the Supreme
Court of Cassation shall pronounce in cases where substantial financial
interests are involved.
Irrespective of the technical form to be used for that purpose (the Supreme
Court of Cassation could either stop acting as a regular instance and
extraordinary review could be introduced similar to that existing before, or
could alternatively keep its nature of a third regular instance with a
possibility to pronounce selectively (like the Supreme Court of the United
States), thus the work of the Supreme Court of Cassation would largely
be relieved and its quality is expected to improve as a result of that.
Indeed, the workload of that institution is currently unbearable.
On the other hand, the possibilities to remit the case back for rehearing
by the lower instance (whichever it is) should be very limited.
l An alternative would be to keep the regular three-instance proceedings
but sharply reduce the number of cases on which the Supreme Court
of Cassation would pronounce (it should ensure the accurate and
uniform application of the laws by all courts when it comes to
fundamental issues of law-enforcement, and then (optionally)
pronounce on cases where very large public or financial interests are
at stake).
If the three-instance regular procedure is kept (regardless of whether the
Supreme Court of Cassation would be empowered to pronounce
selectively), parties should be allowed to skip instances where the issue
at stake only concerns the correct application of substantive rules.
l The number of instances involved in the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments and arbitral awards also needs to be reconsidered
(two instances are recommended, the first of them being Sofia Court
of Appeal (or the appellate courts) and the second being the Supreme
Court of Cassation.
l The participation of counsel in civil proceedings should be radically
revised. At present, attorneys bear no responsibility for any abusive
exercise of procedural rights stemming from the law. Responsibility
must be provided for, including suspension or disbarment for clearly
unreasonable procedural steps (similarly to the arrangements in other
countries, e.g. the United States).
As a guarantee for the liability of counsel, any steps on behalf of a party
should be prohibited where there is authorized counsel, etc. A
requirement should be introduced for the illness of a party or attorney
12 The rules on the operation of the first instance will be addressed separately, see below.
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involved in a case to be established only by medical doctors of
confidence with the respective court. To that effect, stringent rules should
be put in place to regulate not only the ethics of judges but also that of
attorneys.
l Rules must be enacted to outlaw contempt of court; the existing
obstacles to serving summonses and notices on natural and legal
persons should be removed.
l Strict legislative action should be taken to counter the widespread
tendency of the administration and the municipalities to disregard the
orders of the court and effective legal liability (criminal and
administrative) should be introduced for failure to respect court acts.
The existing rule of s.296 of the Criminal Code is clearly inadequate to
resist this trend which has become disturbing.
l The so-called mandamus proceedings should be introduced (an
institute known to Bulgarian legal history and to the modern legal
systems in many countries, e.g. the Czech Republic, Israel, etc.).
l The idea should be discussed of setting up specialized labor courts
that should act as a sole fast-track instance (two instances should only
be provided for some very important categories of labor disputes),
with a possibility for review by the Supreme Court of Cassation (the
principle of selection should apply here as well).
3.4.2. Changes in procedure at first instance
Procedure at first instance should be seriously revized. At present, the
parties tend to disclose their cases step by step and any new submission
or objection by one of them forces the court to grant leave for counter-
allegations by the other party. The procedure thus gets procrastinated.
Moreover, the parties are able to keep their trumps for the last minute of
the procedure at first instance (and with the liberal regime of appellate
proceedings, trumps can even be played on appeal). In order to avoid
that, the following steps are suggested:
l A compulsory exchange of memoranda between the parties should
be required before an open hearing is scheduled. The parties should
be obliged to make (or otherwise be precluded from making) all their
relevant allegations and induce any evidence at their disposal, including
authenticated depositions by individuals who could be summoned as
witnesses (if there are new rules on the involvement of experts in the
proceedings, they should also be required to provide beforehand their
expert opinions on the case). There should be a double exchange of
papers. Thus, before the parties appear in the courtroom for an open
hearing, they will have disclosed all their possible allegations and
evidence.
Of course, the existence of such a system requires an effective and
working system of legal aid for the people unable to engage in legal
proceedings on their own account because of financial constraints.
One possible effect of that approach would be a larger number of
settlements already at the outset of the process. Depending on the
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evidentiary material collected prior to the court stage, the court should
have the power to instruct (or oblige) the parties to resort to mediation
or conciliation with the help of qualified experts. This could make even
larger the number of settlements (especially if the facts of a case are more
complex than its legal aspects). At the same time, account should be taken
of the potential for corruption that would be inherent in that arrangement.
Such a framework would help root out the attitudes dating back to the
classical period of adversarial proceedings, viz. to fight with all forces and
means and to use the procedural possibilities to the maximum extent,
even though the factual and legal aspects of the case are clear from the
outset.
l It is necessary to rethink the rules concerning the statements by the
parties to a case. The current situation where the parties can factually
conceal truth or state untruth in the process without any attaching
liability is grossly unacceptable from the point of view of modern
requirements. In particularly, the rule of s.114 of the Code of Civil
Procedure should be reworded as it currently excludes the possibility
for a defendant who is a legal person to answer questions.
l Any opportunity should be excluded to submit evidence (other than
newly-occurred facts or newly-discovered or newly-created evidence
within the meaning of s.231 of the Code of Civil Procedure) after the
exchange of memoranda and papers between the parties. That,
however, should be effected by way of precluding the possibility to
induce evidence later, rather than by imposing sanctions (as the latter
are usually inadequate).
l The rules on the various types of evidentiary means should be
updated. This is especially relevant in light of the latest technological
developments, e.g. the large-scale use of the Internet, the introduction
of e-signatures and e-commerce. On the other hand, though, abuse
of the existing rules has reached disproportionate dimensions. Such
abuse is an essential tool that benefits corruption.
l The role of expert witnesses in the proceedings should be
reconsidered. It is no secret that the existing form of involvement of
experts in the process is a major technique whereby a judgment can
be obtained for a given party, at odds with the facts and the law. On
the other hand, the provision of s.291 of the Criminal Code is far too
narrow and fails to provide a decent list of possible forms of bad-faith
conduct by the experts. It is high time to also introduce an ethics code
for experts.
Proposals have been made as well to rely on the experience of common
law systems in involving experts: each party could draw in an expert who
provides an opinion and the final assessment would be in the hands of
the court. Initially that would certainly make the work of the courts more
difficult but it seems to be the only possible exit from the current practice.
l The rules on the modifications of the claim should be changed and
there should be an explicit mention that a plaintiff may modify or
complement his or her claim.
l The rules on keeping minutes at open court hearings should be
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reformulated. Given the modern technical methods of recording the
statements made by parties, witnessed and experts, it is no longer
thinkable for proceedings to be recorded under the dictation of the
president of the panel (or of the judge). This is especially inopportune
with respect to witness testimony as witnesses face criminal liability
for false statements13.
l The provisions should be improved on the award of costs and
expenses and it should be provided that reasonable expenses for
counsel (or for the involvement of experts, if the rules on experts are
modified) shall be subject to reimbursement; the flippant requirement
that expenses should only be incurred to pay one counsel should be
removed. An express possibility should be provided to recognize
contingency fees - for example, one could think of awarding such
expenses on a conditional basis, the expense should then be proven
or agreements to retain counsel, authenticated by a notary, could be
recognized.
l Minimum rules should be introduced on the so-called class actions.
l The rules on fast-track proceedings should be revisited, including
those on appeals against delays. Such appeals should be lodged with
the president of the court where the case is pending and this route
should also be available in proceedings before the Supreme Court of
Cassation (if the current workload of that institution remains
unchanged).
3.4.3. Summoning and serving notice
The rules on summoning and those on serving notices should be
fundamentally revised.
l The initial summoning for hearings should be based on new rules.
The requirement that the initial summoning of all legal entities is to
take place at the address of their management should be refined. As
regards natural persons, there should be a rule on the situation where
the summonsing officer is physically unable to contact the addressee
of the summons as the entrance of the building is not readily accessible
(e.g. in estates with heightened security arrangements where the access
of outsiders is prohibited).
l The person who signs the summons should be required to enter in it
all his or her names and the address, regardless of the capacity in which
they receive the summons (for that purpose, even an amendment to
the existing framework could empower the summonsing officer to
check the signatorys identity papers).
l Serious liability should attach to any failure of summonsing officers
to issue the summons as prescribed by law. It should be explicitly
13 There is a very good probability for someone sentenced for perjury based on court hearing minutes drawn up under the
dictation of the president of the chamber to succeed in proceedings against Bulgaria before the European Court of
Human Rights for the existence of such a rule.
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provided that such offences would entail disciplinary dismissal. This
proposal is based on the existing widespread practice of summonsing
officers to receive bribes in order to fail to summon a party properly,
and those bribes largely exceed the fine they face (50 Levs). At the
same time, the profession of summonsing officers does not require
any special qualification and there are many unemployed people who
could perform those functions.
l Where the case is adjourned and the next hearing is not immediately
scheduled, the party should take care to inform itself of the date of
the next hearing (to obviate the possible abuse by judges acting in
bad faith, a minimum period of 10 or 15 or any other number of days
between the date of scheduling the case and the date on which the
actual open hearing takes place could be envisaged, so that parties
would not be forced to inquire every day).
l The pronouncement of judgments in civil cases could take place in
an open hearing (and in line with the principle described, and with
the facility proposed above, a party should keep track of when the
hearing is to be held). In that situation it would become unnecessary
to serve the party with notice that the text of the judgment and its
reasons are ready as that is a major factor contributing to procedural
delays. In addition, pronouncement in an open hearing would mean
that the judge will face both parties, when delivering the judgment, as
opposed to the parties learning about the judgment from the court
registers.
l After a careful examination of the existing internal regulations and
taking account of the relevant international instruments, a rule should
be introduced that if an individual cannot be found at his or her
permanent address for more than 15 days, the summons should be
left at the municipality in question and the summoning should be
deemed regular.
The introduction of a radical rule should be considered, namely that once
a party has been properly summoned for the case, that party should bear
the burden of informing itself about the development of the proceedings
up to their end at all regular instances. This would certainly require the
supply of technical equipment and facilities for the remote provision of
information to those citizens who need it.
3.4.4. Collateral proceedings and enforcement
It is urgent to uphold the rights of those seeking protection in collateral
and enforcement proceedings by allowing review by the Supreme Court
of Cassation (as restricted and selective as that review might be). In relation
to that, the following steps are suggested:
l The rules on allowing and obtaining collateral should be fun-
damentally changed. It should not be forgotten, though, that security
may be necessary regardless of the type of action brought; such a need
exists also where the effects of a legal proceeding could entail
secondary legal relationships.
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l Tthe grounds for enforcement should be reconsidered (e.g. is it
appropriate to maintain grounds for enforcement like the ones in s.
237(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (like promissory notes). Such
grounds for enforcement may enable horrific abuse while the
instruments listed in the provision are not used for their key functions
as prescribed by law.
l The rules on enforcement should be entirely revised. The existing
provisions on the different methods of enforcement are in a completely
intolerable shape - the paradigm needs to be changed. The only
acceptable modern solution about foreclosure is to have auctions with
open bidding, coupled with an unrestricted right to submit bids.
l It is compelling to discuss and introduce private enforcement (due
consideration being given to the rights and wrongs of the rules on
private notaries).
As to the specific proposals for reform in civil procedure, a contradiction
comes to light when that matter is analyzed. On the one hand, the
proposed reform is aimed at curbing and combating corruption in the
area of civil procedure and civil law. On the other hand, some of the
proposed options for a new framework of civil procedure may be expected
to give rise to new sources of corruption. It could be safely assumed that
giving the courts wider freedom (selective pronouncement of the Supreme
Court of Cassation, etc.) would generate such new hubs of corruption.
Nonetheless, the building up of a system of a high-quality and effective
civil procedure should be given priority, as the very fact of its existence
would serve as a guarantee that corruption will be reduced and fought
against.
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PART FOUR
REFORM IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Corruption in the administrative area undermines the trust in State
authority, in the judicial system and in public administration, and tends
to be increasingly perceived as a criminal feature of the system itself rather
than as a series of criminal acts committed by individual organizations,
institutions or officials.
Some essential reasons for the significant growth of corruption in the
administrative sphere, which are also relevant to the reform of the
Judiciary, could be summarized as follows: the lack of a clear system of
judicial review over the steps undertaken by the administration; somewhat
obscure rules on administrative disputes; rather ambiguous limits of
operational autonomy for the administration which is not always subject
to control; a slow and clumsy bureaucratic machinery; no specific
attention to ethics in public administration and in administrative justice;
lacking or weaker confidence of citizens in the steps made by the
administrative and judicial authorities.
A major problem of administrative law now is the lack of consistent
administrative legislation and procedures. The numerous amendments
to substantive administrative laws are frequently discrepant and
incompatible, give rise to many gaps and ambiguities, and invite conflicting
interpretation. The existing rules on the issuance and challenging of
secondary legislation and of individual administrative acts are rather
obsolete and should be fundamentally revised. At present, administrative
proceedings are governed by the following instruments and rules: the
Constitution of Bulgaria (s. 120, subs 1) which generally provides for judicial
review of the lawfulness of any acts issued or steps made by administrative
authorities; the Law on Administrative Proceedings (published, SG, issue 90
of 1979); the Law on Administrative Offences and Penalties (published, SG,
issue 92 of 1969); the Law on Legislative Instruments (published, SG, issue
21 of 1973) and the Law on the Supreme Administrative Court (published,
SG, issue 122 of 1997). Those legal instruments were adopted at different
times, there is no consistency among them and they reflect different sets
of values. Their enforcement and interpretation are therefore especially
difficult and inhibit the access of citizens to justice.
All these factors should be in the focus of reforms in administrative law
and procedure if those reforms are to become an efficient tool to suppress
corruption by way of subjecting the acts and the decisions of public
administration to judicial scrutiny.
1.1. Problems in substantive administrative law
In view of combating corruption in the process of enforcing administrative
law, the following major problems in substantive administrative provisions
should be singled out:
1. General
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l problems relating to the legislative framework of public administration
and to its consistent implementation
In spite of the legislative measures undertaken to implement a uniform
organizational pattern for the administration and common internal rules
for the administrative structures of all executive bodies, be they central
or regional or municipal (Law on Administration, Ordinance Laying Down
the Conditions and the Procedure for Keeping a Register of Administrative
Structures and of the Acts of the Bodies of the Executive), corruption still affects
to a larger or lesser degree the administration of all those bodies.
The measures aimed to make the work of individual administrations more
transparent are far from sufficient. While almost all administrations have
provided special reception rooms where citizens can file applications or
complaints, there are no particularly efficient feedback mechanisms or
adequate legal rules. While legislative provisions exist on how to exercise
the right of access to public information (Law on Access to Public
Information, published, SG, issue 55 of 2000, amended and supplemented,
issues 1 of 2002 and 45 of 2002), their implementation has identified the
lack of sufficient guarantees for transparency and accountability and a
persisting strive of the administration to keep for official use only much
of the information about its operations. The Law on Access to Classified
Information (in force as from 4 May 2000) covers the creation, processing
and storage of any information that represents a State or official secret,
and lays down the conditions and the procedure for providing access to
such information. Nonetheless, there are still opportunities to refuse, by
reference to obscure criteria, access to information constituting an official
secret and that environment is quite conducive to corruption.
At the same time, though, the annual reports on the situation in the
administration as a whole, and of some individual administrations offer no
findings of corrupt practices, nor are there any suggestions for specific
anti-corruption measures. It is still rather difficult to pinpoint the indices
that could be used to assess the efficiency of administrative operation
and to manage performance in a purpose-oriented manner.
l problems with the framework of professional civil service and with
its consistent implementation
The impression of the public that those working in the administration are
highly corruptible strongly invites an in-depth analysis of the
implementation of the Law on the Civil Servant and of the anti-corruption
measures envisaged therein.
In line with the Law on the Civil Servant, the status of civil servants has
been introduced in all structures of the central administration, in the
regional administrations and in 95 per cent of the municipal
administrations. It is somewhat perplexing, however, that this status is
inapplicable to those working in the National Audit Office and in the
tax administration. This is even more surprising given the responsible
supervisory functions vested in those bodies. Expert positions in the
general administration are still subject to the Labor Code and the
contemplated extension of Law on the Civil Servant to those positions has
been delayed without good cause. There has been a recent trend to insert
in sector-specific legislation (i.e. the Law on the Judiciary as regards court
clerks, the Law on the Ministry of Interior, the Law on Defense and on the
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Armed Forces, the Law on the Constitutional Court) only a few beneficial
elements of the civil servants status, without taking the status as a whole
on board in the respective sector. Any deviations from, and exceptions
to, the status of civil servants may easily become an obstacle to the
promotion of a system of professional civil service based on corruption-
free behavior and culture.
As competitions are not compulsory when someone is appointed in the
civil service, that method is simply not applied by most administrations.
This brings forth the reasonable suspicion that improper influences are,
or might be, exerted when people are appointed as civil servants. The
lack of clear criteria to evaluate the professional knowledge and skills of
applicants is favorable to corruption and fails to guarantee any objective
selection or recruitment based solely on professional merit. The possibility
given to any head of administration to appoint at his own choice any of
the three applicants ranked by the competition committee, rather than
the best-performing candidate, also benefits corruption.
The statutory guarantees for stability, which should be a crucial corruption-
deterring factor in the administration, are by far insufficient. In quite a
few cases the formal internal restructuring of some units of the
administration is used to remove specific civil servants from office. The
higher levels of the administration aspire to dilute the divide between
political and career-based appointments. This puts a serious strain on
the overall implementation of the status of civil servants, as stability lies
in its very heart.
The draft amendments to the Law on the Civil Servant prepared by the
Government envisage a series of anti-corruption measures, such as: a
mandatory requirement of holding competitions upon appointment;
introducing incompatibility between the position of a civil servant and
the functions of a trustee or liquidator; conflict-of-interest rules;
abolishing the possibility for premature promotion in rank that is not
based on clear criteria, etc.
l problems in the system of administrative services and with the
access to information
The expected results of the implementation of the Law on Administrative
Services to Natural and Legal Persons, viz. lawfulness, speed, accessibility,
good quality of the service provided and deterrence of corruption,
have not materialized yet. There is no shared understanding that efficient
services are unthinkable of unless the procedures within each separate
administration improve. There are great discrepancies in the level of
administrative services attained in different administrations. This virtually
thwarts the gradual development of administrative work from the mere
provision of services by a given administration into an integrated
administrative servicing, or into a common pattern of one-stop shop
servicing by all administrations in the Executive. This finding is reconfirmed
by the fact that the legislation rarely provides for procedures where several
administrations are bound to co-ordinate among themselves ex officio.
The process of improving administrative services is also severely frustrated
by meager funding which prevents the supply of documents, equipment
and information required for the operations.
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l the lack of a clear-cut division between the powers of the central
and local administration
The interweaving of powers most often results in duplicating work and
reshuffling duties which, in turn, is conducive to abuse and irresponsibility.
l no uniform concept of administrative act exists
Different legal instruments prescribe different contents and scopes for
the concept of administrative act. This can be easily seen in s. 120(2) of
the Constitution, s. 2 and 3 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, s. 19(5)
and (4) of the Law on Administration, the Law on the Supreme Administrative
Court, and many others.
To further confuse the situation, a number of instruments do not refer to
concept of administrative act at all, thus inviting hesitation as to how
the acts they provide for should be defined and reviewed. One example
is the term decisions of the land commission: when these are challenged,
regional courts sometimes believe that they are not administrative acts
but concern property matters, so the ensuing disputes should not qualify
as administrative, but as civil ones.
The Law on Administrative Proceedings does not provide an exhaustive
definition of the concept of administrative acts. There is no uniform legal
criterion to be used for excluding some administrative acts from judicial
review.
A significant source of corruption is the lack of distinction between two
clearly distinct capacities of the State: its capacity as the carrier of
Executive power and its capacity as an economic operator who manages
and disposes of state-owned property. Similarly, no distinction is made
between individual administrative acts whereby the State exercises its
public function of regulating and organizing public life, and the acts
whereby the State merely carries out specific activities relative to the
management of State-owned assets14 . The identical arrangements for
appealing against such essentially different instruments therefore
frequently blocks normal economic life, thus creating preconditions for
corrupt practices.
l the lack of legal rules on key concepts and legal structures
Bulgarian administrative legislation does not contain any legal definition
of the concepts of nullity and voidability of administrative acts and
the interpretation of those concepts is entirely left to administrative-law
theory and to the courts.
14 Judgment No. 19 of the Constitutional Court of 23 December 1993 in case No. 11/93 describes the power of the Council
of Ministers, which is the highest administrative authority in the country, to organise the management of State-owned
property as a typically managerial function. The vast material scope of that constitutional power is defined as covering
not only the two types of property the State may have in Bulgaria, i.e. public and private property, but also other rights
and duties of the State that can be valued in money. Express mention is made of the fact that in the context of that
organisational activity, the Council of Ministers may issue acts but the same activity could also be carried out by indi-
vidual ministers or by other bodies empowered by the Council of Ministers to do so. In other words, in its capacity as a
high Executive body, the Council of Ministers decides on the basis of expediency who and how should manage that
property, unless otherwise provided in law. At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that the regime of sites which
form either private or public (other than exclusive) property of the State or the municipalities shall be laid down by law,
and in the exercise of their right to private property the State and the municipalities shall be placed on an equal footing
with all citizens and legal entities.
79
There are no clear criteria to define the concept of interested parties
in administrative proceedings, and improper influences and practices
can boost at ease on that account.
l the lack of adequate provisions on the situations where the
administration fails to pronounce within the time limits set in the
law (the so-called tacit refusal)
This structure persists in the shape in which it existed in an earlier social
setting, where there was no division of powers, so it provides no
guarantees for the respect of citizens rights. The rules on challenging
tacit refusals before the court are equally unsatisfactory under the new
circumstances. The appeals procedure is slow and dear, so many private
individuals prefer to dispense with it. As a matter of fact, in numerous
cases the protection of citizens rights is used to shield their actual
infringement, as the administration simply keeps silent when it receives
requests.
The frequent instances of tacit refusals, which are more often than not
the result of corrupt practices, entails the uncontrollable transfer of
functions which are typical of the administration, to the court. The courts
thus engage in unusual activities (they decide on issues of governance
and power which fal l  entirely into the competence of public
administration) and this fuels secondary corruption at the level of the
administration of justice.
l operational autonomy
The widest field for corruption in the administrative sphere is the so-
called operational autonomy, i.e. the legal possibility of the administration
of any Executive body to assess and define its conduct on grounds of
advisability, albeit within the framework and in line with the objectives
of the law.
When entrusting an administrative body with the power to rely on
operational autonomy, the law-maker normally has in mind the attainment
of specific targets through the exercise of that bodys competence. In
such cases, the Legislature believes that the body in question will best
perform the functions assigned to it if it has the legal possibility to assess
and choose its own steps on a case-by-case basis. The lack of adequate
controls for lawfulness or advisability, though, frequently makes
operational autonomy translate into arbitrary or illegal steps by the
administration, and all these factors contribute to corruption to the largest
possible extent.
At the same time, some laws contain legal rules which pave the way for
corruption as they give powers to the administrative authorities but fail
to identify any criteria or to give any instruction as to why a particular
law should regulate specific cases of clashing interests (for example, the
Law on Civil Registration, in its s. 12, subsections 2 and 3, provides as follows:
Where both parents fail to reach an agreement on the name, the public
official shall enter in the certificate of birth only one of the names proposed
by the parents. Where the parents fail to identify a name, the public
official shall determine the name which he or she deems most appropriate
in the case at hand. How would a public official determine which of the
names proposed by the parents should be entered in the certificate?).
Undefined concepts or expressions in some laws also enable broad
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interpretation and enforcement and, hence, corruption. Such an example
might be incongruous speed, a concept used in s. 20(2) of the Law on
Road Traffic. Such provisions greatly risk to become corruption-generating
incentives, especially when used in privatization and public procurement
laws.
A detailed analysis is needed of the norms which enable the administration
to exercise discretion and to decide in favor of one party or the other,
while not allowing for any creativity, nor requiring that a matter be settled
also in view of the public interest involved.
1.2. Shortcomings in the legal framework of administrative proce-
dure
In view of judicial reform in general, and of administrative procedure in
particular, the following major drawbacks and problems emerge from
the analysis of the legal framework of administrative procedure:
l the existence of plenty of sources of administrative-procedure law,
which are moreover inconsistent
The existence of many and diverse sources of administrative-procedure
law makes control over the administration rather inefficient, waters down
the responsibilities of the different supervisory authorities, undermines
the reputation of judicial review, and results in poor information for the
citizens about how and where they should challenge illegal or incorrect
administrative acts (for instance, in administrative practice the existing
Law on Citizens Proposals, Petitions, Complaints and Applications is often
applied in parallel to, or instead of, the Law on Administrative Proceedings).
Legal instruments belonging to other areas of law, e.g. constitutional law,
civil law and civil procedure, criminal law and criminal procedure, labor
law, fiscal law and fiscal procedure, tax law, public international law,
sometimes contain administrative provisions.
There is no clear distinction between administrative-procedure law and
other sets of procedural provisions, in particular between tax proceedings
and administrative proceedings. The Code of Tax Procedure, for instance,
provides for a route of challenging administrative acts other than the one
set out in the Law on Administrative Proceedings or the Law on the Supreme
Administrative Court. The Code of Tax Procedure has introduced the
compulsory challenging of tax reassessments following an administrative
procedure as a precondition for any subsequent judicial review, and
precludes the challenging of initial tax assessments in court.
Because of the different approaches used, references to the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure result in inaccuracies, gaps
or even inconsistencies with the laws on administrative procedure. This
is due to the different legal nature of the relations covered by any of
those instruments. That situation frustrates enormously the examination
of administrative disputes by district (second-tier) courts when they hear
appeals lodged under the Law of Administrative Proceedings. It also creates
difficulties when certain disputes fall within the competence of the
Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), as the Law on the Supreme
Administrative Court provides for a special procedure in such cases.
Under the existing rules on administrative procedure, the Code of Civil
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Procedure has subsidiary application and this fails to mirror the specific
nature of administrative legal relationships. The aspiration of the law-
maker to put a coherent body of procedural rules in place is thus
compromised, as is efficient administrative justice.
The interpretative decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court are
binding on the bodies of the Judiciary and on the bodies of the Executive,
as well as on the authorities of local self-government, but this does not
imply that they could substitute for statutory rules. The lasting relations
of administrative procedure (e.g. those concerning cassation proceedings
or the rights of third interested parties) must not be governed by
interpretative decisions, or else there would be confl icting
pronouncements, fragmentation and inconsistency.
The existing legal rules on administrative justice fail to contribute to the
development and operation of a consistent and uniform system of justice
as far as administrative procedure is concerned. Those rules form a
substantial obstacle to the development of administrative justice and to
identifying the strategic legislative priorities for its improvement.
The discrepant, non-standardized sets of administrative proceedings may
even push the courts to adopt different approaches, and this is beneficial
to corrupt practices.
l the absence of unambiguous legal rules on some procedures and
on major legal structures
The cassation appeals against court judgments in administrative cases
give rise to issues which have no definite or explicit legislative response
in the pieces of administrative-procedure legislation, at least not so far.
The subsidiary application of the Code of Civil Procedure is insufficient,
nor is the Code fit to serve as a comprehensive legal basis for the complex
and specific area of administrative justice. Moreover, this approach fails
to take on board the specificity of administrative procedure and the
enhanced ex officio principle which underlies it. Gaps and inconsistent
interpretations on issues such as grounds for cassation, evidence, time
limits for lodging or challenging appeals, cassation appeals before the
district courts, etc. quite naturally produce divergent case-law.
Bulgarian law has no provisions on corporate liability, be it civil or criminal
or administrative.
l no specialization at courts of first instance
The lack of specialization at first-instance courts results in some
administrative cases being handled by civil or criminal judges who find it
more difficult to sink into the peculiarities of administrative proceedings.
This affects essentially the quality of their judgments and overloads the
instance of cassation, i.e. the Supreme Administrative Court, with cases
abundant in poor examination of both the facts and the law, and not
accompanied by the requisite evidentiary material. Administrative
disputes are currently heard by the Supreme Administrative Court; special
administrative divisions exist in some district courts and yet another group
of courts have no specialization whatsoever when it comes to
administrative cases.
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l failure to respect and comply with court acts
Respect for and compliance with court acts form a fully-fledged
manifestation of the principle of the rule of law. The rule of law is upheld
not only when cases are resolved, but also when judgments are fulfilled.
Failure to respect and comply with court judgments is a common problem
across the country.
In the sphere of administrative law, the relations between the court, on
the one hand, and the administrative bodies having issued the acts under
attack, on the other hand, are somewhat problematic. The forwarding of
administrative files is often delayed, the court is not assisted in clarifying
the case through relevant facts and submissions, and there are instances
of failure to fulfil the judgments.
The judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court are binding on the
authorities and on the persons having participated in a case. If the
administrative act appealed against is reversed, the judgment is binding
erga omnes (s. 30, Law on SAC). The judgments delivered by the Supreme
Administrative Court are subject to immediate enforcement by the
authorities having issued, or applying the act reversed (s. 32, Law on SAC).
Corrupt practices transpire when the administrative body which must act
so as to fulfil the court judgment and the instructions of the court either
fails to comply with the judgment or refrains from taking on board the
instructions and the spirit of that judgment: for example, a privatization
deal is not terminated although the court has repealed the illegal
administrative order whereby the buyer was selected, or a privatization
procedure starts from scratch instead of being resumed from the stage
where the violation occurred, etc. The administrative penalties envisaged
for such cases are extremely inefficient and, even worse, are often not
enforced in practice.
The reform of administrative law and procedure is aimed at improving
the legal and organizational framework of administrative justice so as to
prevent corruption by introducing a modern system of administrative
legislation and setting out efficient mechanisms to keep the work of public
administration under judicial review.
3.1. Proposed reforms in administrative law
Changes are compelling in substantive administrative law, and especially
in the legal instruments that regulate the work of the administration, along
the following lines:
3.1.1. Introducing wider accountability and access to the information
kept by public authorities which could reduce the chances for
corrupt acts or omissions.
3.1.2. Regulating operational autonomy by adopting internal rules that
should define the method of decision-making when operational
autonomy is granted. The internal rules will not be the same for all
administrative bodies, they will not even be binding but will largely
facilitate the work of the corresponding authority and articulate
clearly the methods, approaches, criteria and measures to be used
2. The objective of
reforms in
administrative law
and procedure
3. Proposed reforms
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by that authority when it operates autonomously. At the same time,
all possible actions that could be undertaken by the respective
authority in exercising its operational autonomy should be provided
for in law. They should form part of the authoritys competence
and should correspond, in their content and objective, to the
legislation in force. That process needs clear regulations and
control.
The lawfulness of any exercise of operational autonomy must be subject
to judicial review. A more problematic issue, though, is the possible review
of the expediency of the steps made by the administration, as operational
autonomy implies expediency.
It is debatable whether or not review could be entrusted to the so-called
special jurisdictions. The grounds to resist the revival of the wide resort
to administrative jurisdictions derive from the Constitution, as it provides
for an overall judicial review of the acts and steps of the administration.
The view in favor of special jurisdictions (that should inter alia review the
expediency of administrative decisions) is substantiated with the argument
that the Constitution only prevents bodies other than the courts listed in
the Constitution or set up by virtue of special laws, from administering
justice, i.e. from deciding on legal disputes. It is claimed that review by a
special jurisdiction does not represent a genuine legal dispute but a dispute
concerning the lawful exercise of an indisputable right.
The usefulness of special jurisdictions in controlling operational autonomy
requires further debate and a solution should be forged that will be both
working and faithful to the Constitution.
3.1.3. Career promotion of civil servants depending on their performance
when they exercise their official duties, based on fair and trans-
parent career development procedures. Such steps should con-
tribute to eliminating the existing conditions for inside corruption.
3.1.4. Promoting a general system to improve the professional know-
ledge and skills of those working in the administration. An
important element could be the introduction of a systematic
training for civil servants in corruption-related matters at the
Institute of Public Administration and European Integration, an
institution that has been involved for nearly two years now mostly
in the provision of compulsory or specialized training to civil
servants.
3.1.5. Putting a reliable feedback mechanism in place to stay in touch
with service users, so that their skills could be used both to better
the process of administrative servicing and to suppress corruption.
Special attention should be given to the provision of different lines
of access to services (telephones, mail, e-mail, Internet portals),
and to the implementation of floating working hours in adminis-
trative service units. Offering specialized training to civil servants
at those units, so as to inspire a new administrative culture and to
amplify their competence, would contribute to make the provi-
sion of administrative services more efficient and, hence, restrain
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the causes for corruption. Such training should prepare the ser-
vants to meet the novel requirements in their contacts with citi-
zens, viz. the provision of information, transparent decision-
making, right to appeal. It is necessary to implement, stage by stage
and consistently, the State E-Government Strategy and the Govern-
ment Concept Paper for Improving Administrative Services Based on the
One-Stop Shop Principle. These two documents outline the direc-
tions for a future modern and efficient governance in response to
the needs of the public for high-quality and easily accessible ad-
ministrative services, inter alia by way of electronic links between
the citizens and the various agencies of public administration. Al-
though in the most optimistic scenario at least 7 to 10 years will be
needed to complete the automation of administrative processes,
the gradual introduction of electronic operations within that pro-
cess will enhance its transparency, accountability, flexibility and
speed, and will reduce the costs. The exercise of state power, inter
alia by providing administrative services though information tech-
nologies, would in all cases contribute to curbing bureaucracy and
building up a corruption-deterring environment.
3.1.6. Devising legislative rules, adequate to the novel conditions, to
regulate the constitutional right of citizens to file complaints, as
the existing Law on Citizens Proposals, Petitions, Complaints and
Applications of 1980 is hopelessly outdated.
3.1.7. Revising completely the tacit refusal and the appeals against
such refusals. Two options are offered for discussion. The first is
to retain tacit refusals but only provided that on appeal the court
will invariably review the decision and handle the liability of the
corresponding administrative body or of the person who failed to
pronounce on time, while imposing penalties in the same pro-
ceedings. The second option is to establish the principle that fail-
ure of the administration to pronounce on time shall be construed
as a reply in the affirmative to the request addressed to it.  That
would imply extending the structure of tacit refusals as enshrined
in the newly-adopted Law on Limiting Administrative Regulation and
Administrative Control (published, SG, issue 55 of 17 June 2003, in
force since 17 December 2003) to a wider number of cases.
3.2. Proposed reforms in administrative procedure
Further improvements in the legal and organizational framework of
administrative justice are associated with the following specific proposals:
3.2.1. Drafting a Code of Administrative Procedure (CAP). The latter should
cover the subject matter of administrative proceedings in the widest
possible sense, as currently governed by the Law on Administrative
Proceedings, the Law on SAC, the Law on Administrative Offences and
Penalties, the Law on Legislative Instruments, and other laws relevant
to the relations between citizens and legal entities, on the one
hand, and public administration, on the other hand, and to court
proceedings in administrative cases. Likewise, explicit rules are
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needed to address the open issues in the administrative procedure,
while interpretative decisions should be reserved for the essential
interpretation of specific cases in court.
At the same time, CAP should not copy provisions or matters from the
Code of Civil Procedure. Unfortunately, this has been the experience with
the Tax Procedure Code which repeats, sometimes with minor discrepancies
and deviations, texts from other procedural laws, thus entailing situations
where the same court might apply different sets of rules to identical
circumstances.
CAP should comprise the general rules of administrative procedure,
including the procedure of issuing administrative acts, the enforcement
of such acts, the imposition of administrative penalties, the appeals against
those acts before another administrative body or before the court. Special
procedural rules should exist for urgent and justified cases but they should
also be contained in CAP, for example in a separate chapter. References
to other procedural codes should be made according to the same
approach and should be restricted, i.e. applicable only where principles
and solutions common to all legal procedures are at stake.
In order to draft a Code of Administrative Procedure meeting the above
requirements, the following steps are required:
l conducting an in-depth analysis of Bulgarian administrative legislation
in view of its streamlining and future codification in a thorough Code
of Administrative Procedure. The idea is to fully set apart administrative-
procedure law and administrative justice and to ensure their autonomy
in relation to civil and criminal justice;
l carrying out a general evaluation of the Bulgarian system of
administrative justice and presenting the practices of the member states
of the European Union to enable comparison;
l to fulfil the tasks identified above, international and European lecturers
and experts must be involved, training and exchange of experience
for Bulgarian experts and practicing judges should be organized;
l setting up a task force with the wide involvement of practicing judges,
scholars and experts to draft a Code of Administrative Procedure. That
task force should form part of a larger expert team developing, at
conceptual level, the subject matters to be regulated by all procedural
codes.
3.2.2. When elaborating CAP, references to the Code of Civil Procedure,
the Code of Criminal Procedure or other procedural laws should be
avoided. Should that prove impossible, such references should be
reduced to a minimum.
3.2.3. The rules in CAP should be conform to the principles embedded
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and to other relevant international conven-
tions ratified by the Bulgaria, as well as to any international con-
ventions on the suppression of corruption to which Bulgaria has
acceded.
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3.2.4. In terms of structure, CAP should cover at least the following
elements of proceedings relative to administrative acts:
l definition of the concept of individual administrative act;
l definition of the concept of general administrative act;
l definition of the concept of instrument of secondary legislation;
l accurately developed criteria for the exclusion of certain administrative
acts from the scope of judicial review; any exceptions should be strictly
justified and kept to a minimum, in line with the European principles
of administrative justice;
l definition of the concept of interested parties;
l rules on the issuance of administrative acts and on the challenging of
such acts before other administrative bodies;
l updating and specifying the prerequisites under which an
administrative body may allow for the preliminary enforcement of an
administrative act;
l further to introducing substantive legal rules on the nullity and
voidability of administrative acts, providing for procedures that should
help overcome the practical difficulties in distinguishing between the
two concepts;
l providing exhaustive rules on proceedings at first instance and on
proceedings before SAC;
l preserving the current two-instance court procedure, in line with the
proposed reforms in civil law and procedure;
l providing autonomous rules, other than those in the Code of Civil
Procedure, on summoning, notices, evidence and evidentiary means;
the latter, in particular, should be modernized and brought into line
with modern trends in the development of social life, such as the
Internet, e-documents, etc.;
l explicitly providing an opportunity for interested parties who have
not participated in the administrative proceedings to be able to initiate
the reversal of effective court judgments; this possibility is currently
covered by Interpretative Decision No.1 of 2001 of the General
Assembly of Judges at SAC;
l providing for corporate pecuniary liability;
l providing for specific rules on collateral to match the demands of
administrative procedure;
l providing rules on the enforcement of judgments by the administration.
The legal procedure whereby sanctions are imposed for failure to
comply with the instructions of the court should be fundamentally
revized;
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l to achieve the aforementioned objective, administrative authorities
should be placed under a more severe threat of administrative penalties
for any failure to comply with judgments; such liability should match
the seriousness of the violation, e.g. higher fines and other appropriate
sanctions should be envisaged;
l providing rules on the liability of the State and on remedying the
damage that may have occurred as a result of an administrative act or
of the failure to issue an act. Redress could take various forms, viz.
compensation in the form of paying an amount of money or ensuring
another benefit (if the damage cannot be directly rectified) or
reinstating the affected parties in their rights. The remedy should not
depend on whether or not there has been any attempt to bring the
individual perpetrator to court; should be fully payable where the
administrative act is found to be illegal, with partial compensation
where the act entailed some damage; should not be payable or should
go down where the victim partially contributed to the damage; and
should be immediately decided on and paid in due course.
It is necessary to introduce unified rules on the steps of the administration
in issuing administrative acts. On grounds of those rules, the administrative
bodies should adopt their own internal regulations for each type of
individual or general administrative acts, and those internal regulations
should be announced in public and be accessible. That would assist
statutory judicial review on the discretionary powers of the administration
in issuing a specific act.
3.2.5. Setting up a new unified system of administrative courts -
regional administrative courts and a Supreme Administrative
Court: pros and cons
Support for setting up a new unified system of regional administrative
courts is based on the current drawbacks of administrative justice which
stem from the lack of specialization at first instance (regional administrative
courts). This entails the need to amend the Constitution of Bulgaria, and
in particular to provide expressly in its s. 119(1) that the system of courts
in the country shall include regional administrative courts.
Should this option be adopted, it is mandatory to examine well the number
of cases heard by district and regional courts at present, so as to rectify
the imbalance in the workload of different courts and to avoid impeding
the access of citizens to justice. Where those courts are set up,
professionals at district courts with operational administrative divisions
should be relied upon.
When building up a new system of administrative courts, any potential
remoteness of justice from people should be prevented. The lesson
with the existing Code of Tax Procedure should be learnt well, as that Code
entrusted the examination of tax cases only to five district courts located
within the territory of the courts of appeal.
The views against such a system also take account of the need to have
specialization in administrative cases at first instance, but this should
allegedly be achieved along the current model of the specialization in
civil or criminal cases. The arguments against the proposal for separate
administrative courts mainly suggest that this would be unreasonable in
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terms of quantity, structure and financial resources needed.
It is therefore recommended that the studies and discussions on this issue
should go on, so that all pros and cons could be carefully weighed and
taken into consideration.
Regardless of the path to be taken, it is necessary to clearly define the
competence of SAC and to devise criteria to streamline the number and
the type of cases heard by that court at first instance, inter alia by evaluating
the underlying public interest. This is required as the Supreme
Administrative Court should be enabled to efficiently implement its
constitutional powers to carry out the supreme supervision for the accurate
and uniform application of the laws by all courts. To that effect SAC should
also issue interpretative decisions to overcome inconsistent case-law.
A careful thought should be given to the introduction of single-member,
three-member and five-member chambers at the Supreme Administrative
Court and to an extended use of closed hearings as a tool to assess on a
preliminary basis the procedural admissibility of complaints.
3.2.6. Training of judges and court clerks
The need should be analyzed for training in administrative law, and spe-
cific training programs should be developed to tackle the implementa-
tion of the future Code of Administrative Procedure. Those programs should
be implemented in the context of the proposals for an overall reform in
the training of magistrates and court clerks (see Part One, section III).
3.2.7. Creating a computer system where the cases should be loaded
(similar to that in the Supreme Administrative Court) and providing
access to both systems via the Internet.
3.2.8. The need to promote the role of public prosecution as an efficient
anti-corruption factor in administrative proceedings
Unlike its role in criminal procedure, public prosecution is not involved
in administrative proceedings as a body of criminal repression, nor does
it necessarily represent the interests of the State. This finding is
reconfirmed by the fact that public prosecutors must participate in court
proceedings where the legality of administrative acts is questioned but
are not bound to do so in administrative liability proceedings where fines
are challenged.
In administrative proceedings, public prosecutors uphold the principle
of legality and supervise the lawfulness of the acts and steps issued or
undertaken by the administration. The public prosecutor pronounces
and gives conclusion on the lawfulness of the administrative act at stake
or on the well-foundedness of the appeal, thus participating in the dispute-
resolution process. An explicit provision is therefore necessary for the
compulsory participation of a public prosecutor in proceedings where
administrative acts of a legislative nature are appealed against before
SAC. That would help reaffirm the role of public prosecution in
administrative procedure and would turn it into a powerful anti-corruption
factor.
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The mandatory participation of prosecutors from district prosecution
offices or from the Prosecution Office with SAC in all court hearings where
administrative acts are appealed against, in cassation proceedings (possibly
initiated on appeal from the Deputy Prosecutor General with SAC on
grounds of s. 33(2) of the Law on SAC), in proceedings for the delivery of
interpretative decisions and for the reversal of effective judgments (Deputy
Prosecutor General with SAC), and the power to propose the resumption
of administrative liability proceedings (district prosecutors) reinforce the
guarantees for compliance with the principle of legality and appear to be
efficient supplementary mechanisms to fight corruption. Therefore, the
recommendations of some foreign experts that the general supervision
of public prosecution to ensure legality or the participation of public
prosecutors in administrative cases should be abolished are unacceptable,
as they result from an insufficiently detailed knowledge of the institution
of public prosecution and of its functions in administrative justice.
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CONCLUSION
Due to the specific nature of its work, the Judiciary has a peculiar, rela-
tively autonomous status in the structure of social relations, although its
development naturally depends on law-making by the political class. The
Judiciary is therefore more resistant to changes and relatively remote from
what might be a burning public issue at a given time. In established de-
mocracies, the third power guarantees legal stability and confidence in
state institutions, it is a symbol of national continuity and traditions. The
Judiciary in transition societies, however, is faced with different expecta-
tions. The extraordinary dynamics of democratic reforms make the civil
society place too much of a hope on the institutions called upon to up-
hold citizens rights and the legitimacy of the state based on the rule of
law. Those attitudes partly derive from the overall disillusionment of the
majority of Bulgarians with the performance of the post-communist state.
In those circumstances, the Judiciary is often perceived as an ultima ratio
- the instance of last resort which is expected to fix all imperfections and
the unfair decisions made by other bodies endowed with state power. It
is therefore understandable that when the social defects of transition
persist, or even intensify, the public finally feels betrayed in its hope that
institutionalized law will take its side. This somehow explains why magis-
trates and the general
public differ so mush
in their assessments of
the spread of corrup-
tion within the Judi-
ciary.
The data from public
opinion polls suggest
that there is a high
level of corruption in
the Judiciary. On the
contrary, every other
magistrate is confident
that public percep-
tions of the spread of
corruption are un-
founded.
Unlike the population
and businessmen,
magistrates derive
their information pri-
marily from personal
experience and obser-
vation. The media are
Opening the Judiciary
towards the public
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
PUBLIC OPINION ON THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY
(PER CENT)
75,5
5,5
19,0
0,0 20,0 40,0 60,0 80,0
Proliferated to the
highest degree
Proliferated to some
degree
Not proliferated at all
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not particularly impor-
tant for magistrates.
Their assessments of
and ideas about cor-
ruption and its spread
in the Judiciary are
mostly formed on the
basis of information
exchanged via infor-
mal communication
channels (contacts
with acquaintances
and colleagues), and
of the mismatch be-
tween the personal in-
come and the stan-
dard of living of some
magistrates.
The majority of magis-
trates think that citi-
zens normally enter-
tain excessive expec-
tations of the work of
the members of the
Judiciary. At the same
time, magistrates are of the view that many citizens with whom they come
into contact fail to know their own rights, merely fuss about the work
of magistrates and are inclined to resort to various corrupt practices in
order to settle the disputable issues informally.
The above findings do not undermine the importance of those reasons
for the drastic decline of public confidence in the Judiciary that are in-
herent in the system. The prevailing public perceptions of slowness, inef-
ficiency and bias, of widespread corruption in the system called upon to
resist crime, are well-founded. The discrepancy between the opinion of
the public and that of magistrates on the level of corruption in the Judi-
ciary reconfirms the existence of a serious problem in the communica-
tion between the Judiciary and the civil society.
This is further proven by the inability of magistrates or the individual
branches of the Judiciary to respond adequately to critical assessments
of their work. According to the results of the survey conducted by Vitosha
Research Agency only a few of them (25.1 per cent) think they should
inform the public about any shortcomings in the operation of the system
they have come across. Moreover, as public pressure grows, some
branches of the Judiciary perceive as hostile even the well-meaning
opinions and recommendations voiced by the civil society, foreign
governments and international organizations. That reaction in turn
enhances public suspicion that members of the Judiciary use their
immunity as a shield, that they are uncontrollable and unapproachable.
An increasing number of magistrates and experts become aware of the
urgent need to change the style of communication between the Judiciary
and the public. Moreover, the first steps have been made to open some
units of the Judiciary towards the problems, the questions and the criticism
Source: CMS of Coalition 2000
HOW OFTEN DO CITIZENS WITH WHOM YOU ARE IN CONTACT WHEN
FULFILLING YOUR PROFESSIONAL DUTIES - (PER CENT)
Normally Sometimes Seldom Never Does not know/
No response
- have excessive expectations
of magistrates and
their work? 56.2 28.0 8.1 2.6 5.1
- fail to know their rights? 52.4 31.5 11.9 2.0 2.2
- show discontent with the
work of magistrates? 34.6 47.1 14.1 2.0 2.2
- prefer to engage in
corrupt acts rather than
uphold their
rights lawfully? 15.4 34.6 26.9 8.8 14.3
- think they can achieve
whatever they want by
offering money or gifts? 12.6 30.4 32.2 15.2 9.7
Behave rudely or impolitely
with court clerks
or magistrates? 9.5 37.4 42.7 6.8 3.5
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featuring its work. New practices are being developed which first of all
demonstrate the aspiration of the Judiciary, or of some of its structures
and representatives, to enter into a public dialogue to discuss the issues
of justice in a transitional environment. The following examples could be
given:
l press officers
Over the past two or three years, some bodies of the Judiciary have started
opening themselves to the society and explaining the nature of their work
to the community. As a result press officers were appointed for that
purpose at some courts15.  That was expressly envisaged by the
amendments to the Law on the Judiciary made in 2002 and the staff positions
should be provided for by the Supreme Judicial Council.
In 2002, press officers were appointed at the appellate, district and
regional courts in Bourgas, the appellate, district and regional courts in
Veliko Tarnovo, the appellate, district and regional courts in Plovdiv, Sofia
Regional Court, at Sofia District Court, Sofia Court of Appeal, and the
Supreme Administrative Court. The officers provide information about
the development of cases (scheduled hearings, progress, key points,
judgments or verdicts) which are of interest to the public.
l access to information about the work of the Judiciary
The opening of the Judiciary towards the public must include the provision
of access to information about the operation of the Judiciary. A guideline
in that respect is Recommendation No. R (81) 7 of the Committee of Minister
of the Council of Europe on Measures Facilitating the Access to Justice. A major
principle underlying the Recommendation is for member states to
undertake all necessary steps to inform the public on the means open to
an individual to assert his rights before courts easily, speedily and
inexpensively. As regards information for the public, it is recommended
to give special attention to and undertake the following measures:
1. Appropriate measures should be taken to inform the public of the
location and the competence of courts, and the way in which proceedings
are commenced or defended before those courts.
2. General information should be available from the court, or a competent
body or service on the following items:
l procedural requirements, provided that this information does not
involve giving legal advice concerning the substance of the case;
l the way in which, and the time within which a decision can be
challenged, the rules of procedure and any required documents to
this effect;
l methods by which a decision might be enforced and, if possible, the
costs, involved.
15 The process of involving press officers to facilitate the communication between the public and the Judiciary was initially
assisted in the framework of a project implemented by the Legal Initiative for Training and Development (PIOR) and
supported by the Open Society Foundation (COLPI Fund, Judicial Reform), and the American Bar Association, Central
and Eurasian Law Initiative, in partnership with the Association of Judges in Bulgaria.
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3. States should take measures to ensure that all procedural documents
are in a simple form and that the language used is comprehensible to the
public and any judicial decision is comprehensible to the parties.
A suitable step towards opening the system is for the individual courts to
develop web sites. Such sites already exist for the Supreme Administrative
Court, Plovdiv Court of Appeal, Plovdiv District Court, the Palace of Justice
in Varna, Varna Regional Court, the Palace of Justice in Shoumen, the
Palace of Justice in Gabrovo. The Supreme Judicial Council has also
launched a web site recently.
- The web site of the Supreme Administrative Court is an impressive
achievement and citizens and attorneys equally believe that it is very
useful. It provides information on current and forthcoming events, as
well as on every pending case, its progress, the possible instructions to
the parties, the judgments, etc.
The following clusters of up-to-date information are available on the
web-site of the Supreme Administrative Court:
l legislative framework of administrative justice;
l jurisdiction of SAC at first instance and on cassation, in private
proceedings, to reverse effective judgments, etc.;
l answers to key questions about the operation of the court, plus
information about the European Court of Human rights;
l current information on the cases brought before and decided
by SAC.
- Varna District Court has the useful practice of providing on-line access
to its information and even loads on the web its annual reports to the
public. Steps in this direction have been also undertaken by other
courts.
Public initiatives at Varna District Court
l public report: Varna District Court reports on its work during
the previous year and informs how its operations might benefit
the citizens;
l web-site with separate headings and instructions on how to ask
questions and receive answers;
l an information system that keeps track of and provides statistics
on fast-track criminal proceedings, and involves Varna Regional
Directorate of Interior, the Regional Court, the Regional Pros-
ecution Office, and the District Court;
l the Open Doors initiative aims at providing basic legal knowl-
edge to adults and younger people between 15 and 19 years of
age. It is an out-of-class form of learning by doing where train-
ing, case studies and simulation proceedings help the partici-
pants to address specific legal topics and issues (violence at home
and among the children, deprivation of parental rights, drugs
and drugs cases, etc.).
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Blagoevgrad District Court and Blagoevgrad Regional Court
l work with document-processing software enabling the quick ac-
cess to data about the progress of cases;
l  have provided the journalists reporting on their activities, with
an electronic manual with basic information about the organi-
zation of those two courts.
The document-processing software and the manual have been
developed by the Judicial Strengthening Program which is financed
by the United States Agency for International Development.
Nonetheless, further steps are required to improve the communication
between the Judiciary and the public. The following could be specified
inter alia:
l introducing the practice of Varna District Court, viz. to provide reports
to the community, at all district courts in the country;
l widely promoting the Open Doors initiative of Varna District Court
in the different structures of the Judiciary;
l carrying out awareness campaigns to explain the functions, the
objectives, the powers and duties of the various branches of the
Judiciary;
l publicizing the work of the Supreme Administrative Court both through
its web site and by publicly announcing the cases heard by that court;
l publicizing the work of appointed court press officers and accelerating
the appointment of such officials in all district towns;
l drafting manuals and leaflets with practical information;
l regularly organizing joint seminars for magistrates and media
representatives;
l organizing an awareness campaign with respect to the Law on Personal
Data Protection;
l providing access to the essential CV details of magistrates, and to the
public register of their property.
When putting in place the indispensable measures for opening the
Judiciary towards the society, special attention should be attached to the
implementation of modern technology, for example:
l initiating projects to facilitate receipt on the Internet of information
about the cases and their progress, and of other information contained
therein. (It might be helpful to make judges and prosecutors regularly
answer questions addressed to them via the Internet);
l introducing automated document-processing systems that should
provide a quick and secure processing of the cases and give timely
and easy access of citizens to the information they need;
l ensuring the use of and access to the registers kept in the judicial
system;
l including the Supreme Court of Cassation and Sofia City Court, which
understandably attract a lot of public attention and interest, in the
public information projects.
